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This thesis documents a simulation model developed to assist in the planning of 
Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of the Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious 
Assault Vehicle (AAAV).  The model simulates a platoon of AAAVs in an amphibious 
assault, using Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) techniques, supported by 
elements of a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) aboard amphibious ships offshore.   
The emphasis of the model is on suitability issues, specifically operational 
availability, maintainability, and supportability.  In particular the effect of logistical 
support for one AAAV on the ability of the platoon to complete a mission.  The purpose 
of the simulation is to gain insight into important and highly sensitive factors that, when 
changed slightly, have large effects on the platoon of AAAV’s ability to perform its 
mission.   
The results of the model show that, the assumed form of the distribution of failure 
times for a single AAAV is the most important aspect of reliability test data.   Simply 
calculating the mean time to failure (MTTF) from data and using an exponential model is 
inadequate.  Even if an observed or estimated MTTF is within an acceptable requirement 
threshold level, if it is characterized by a high or even moderate number of infant failure 
times, then the platoon’s ability to perform its mission is substantially impeded.  Other 
factors that are of importance are the procedure by which a failed AAAV is rescued and 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 vi






B. PROBLEM .......................................................................................................2 
C. PURPOSE.........................................................................................................3 
II. BACKGROUND ..........................................................................................................5 
A. EMPLOYMENT AND TACTICS..................................................................5 
B. THE AAAV.......................................................................................................6 
C. TEST AND EVALUATION............................................................................8 
D. USE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION...............................................10 
III. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................13 
A. THEORY AND BACKGROUND ................................................................13 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MOES.......................................................................14 
C. MODELING INDIVIDUAL AAAVS ..........................................................16 
D. BASIC SIMULATION SCENARIOS..........................................................18 
E. MODELING MORE COMPLICATED SCENARIOS..............................24 
IV.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT...........................................................................................29 
A.  GENERAL......................................................................................................29 
B. MODEL CLASSES AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS .................................29 
1.  Entity Classes ............................................................................................31 
2.  Mover Managers .......................................................................................31 
3.  Random Pause Generators.......................................................................32 
3.  Manager & Process Classes .....................................................................32 
4.  Data Collection and Data Collection Classes..........................................35 
C.   ADJUSTABLE PARAMETERS AND SIMULATION SETTINGS .......36 
V.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS...........................................................................................41 
A.   INITIAL SIMULATION RUNS USING A SIMPLE MODEL WITH 
EXTREME PARAMETER VALUES .........................................................41 
B.   SIMULATION RUNS OF A MORE COMPLICATED MODEL............62 
1.  Development of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU).......................62 
2.  Adding More Levels of Reality:  Making All Settings Stochastic 
and Sampling Failure and Repair Times From the Weibull 
Distribution.........................................................................................65 
3.  Method of Analysis of the Advanced Model...........................................71 
4.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Time To Beach (TTB) ..................73 
5.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Time To LOD (TTS) ....................85 
6.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Mission Availability (Am).............87 
7.  Further Analysis of Different Factor’s Effects on MOE Time to 
LOD (TTS)..........................................................................................94 
 vii
8.  Further Analysis of Different Factor’s Effects on MOE Mission 
Availability (Am)...............................................................................111 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .....................................................117 
LIST OF REFERENCES....................................................................................................121 

















Figure 1.   Event Graph of Failure-Repair Scenario 1.......................................................20 
Figure 2.   Event Graph of Failure-Repair Scenario 2.......................................................23 
Figure 3.   Event Graph of Failure-Repair Scenario 3.......................................................24 
Figure 4.   Comparison of Mean Times for At Least 10 of 12 AAAVs to Reach the 
Beach at Various MTTF When Different Forms of the Distribution of 
Failure Times are Used (AAAVs used as the towing asset)  Parameters for 
the Mixed Exponential are the same as in Tables 3 and 4. ..............................46 
Figure 5.   Comparison of Times for At Least 10 of 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach 
At Various MTTF When Different Tow Methods are Used (Failure Times 
are from the Exponential Distribution). ...........................................................47 
Figure 6.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the Beach When the Form of the Distribution of Failure Times is 
Varied (With MTTF = 6 hrs and AAAVs Used as Towing Asset).  
Parameters for the Mixed Exponential Distribution are:  p=0.5; λ1=1, 
λ2=1/5...............................................................................................................49 
Figure 7.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the Beach When the Towing Method is Varied (With Failure 
Times From the Mixed Exponential Distribution with MTTF = 6 hrs).  
Distribution Parameters are: p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5. ..........................................50 
Figure 8.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the LOD When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied 
(AAAVs were used as the towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed 
Exponential Distribution are: p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/17........................................51 
Figure 9.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the AO When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied 
(AAAVs were used as the towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed 
Exponential Distribution are: p=0.5; λ1=1/6, λ2=1/30.....................................52 
Figure 10.  Distribution of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon Reaching the Beach 
(extreme case where 3 observations are negative).  Distribution Parameters 
are:  p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5. ................................................................................54 
Figure 11.   Comparison of Distributions of the Times to the Beach for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (MTTF = 6 and 
AAAVs used as towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential 
Distribution are: p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/11.  Minimum time to reach beach 
without failure is one hour. ..............................................................................55 
Figure 12.   Comparison of Distributions of the Times to the Beach for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Tow Method is Varied (Distribution is Mixed 
Exponential with MTTF = 6).  Distribution Parameters are: p=0.5; λ1=1, 
λ2=1/11.  Minimum time to reach beach without failure is one hour. .............56 
Figure 13.   Comparison of the Distribution of the Times to the LOD for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (MTTF = 9 and 
 ix
AAAVs are used as towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential 
Distribution are:  p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/17.  Minimum time to reach beach 
without failure is one hour. ..............................................................................57 
Figure 14.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 6 hours).  
Data is shown with 95% confidence interval bounds. .....................................60 
 Figure 15.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 18 
hours).  Data is shown without confidence interval bounds. ...........................61 
Figure 16.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 0.74 and λ = 30.0. ............................67 
Figure 17.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 1.5 and λ = 40.0. ..............................67 
Figure 18.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 3.6 and λ = 40.0. ..............................68 
Figure 19.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs To 
Reach the Beach (TTB). ..................................................................................74 
Figure 20.   Normal Probability Plot of Residuals Where the Response Variable is the 
Time for 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach (TTB). ............................................75 
Figure 21.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are the Times for 12 AAAVs to 
Reach the Beach (TTB). ..................................................................................75 
Figure 22.   Plot of the Interaction Between the Factors MTTF and Failure Distribution 
Where the Response Variable is the Times for 12 AAAVs to Reach the 
Beach (TTB). ...................................................................................................76 
Figure 23.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
Times are from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 3.55 and λ = 20) with MTTF 
= 18 hours. .......................................................................................................78 
Figure 24.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
Times are from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 0.742 and λ = 30) with MTTF 
= 36 hours. .......................................................................................................78 
Figure 25.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
Times are from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 0.74 and λ = 60) with MTTF 
= 72 hours. .......................................................................................................79 
Figure 26.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
Mean TTS.  Plot shows some heteroscedasticity exists...................................81 
Figure 27.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
log(Mean TTS).................................................................................................82 
Figure 28.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable is log of Mean Time for 
12 AAAVs To Reach the Beach (TTB)...........................................................82 
Figure 29.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 
Response Variable is mean TTB......................................................................85 
Figure 30.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs To 
Reach the LOD, or Time to Step-Off (TTS)....................................................86 
Figure 31.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Am........................................88 
Figure 32.   Normal Probability Plot of Residuals Where the Response Variable is Am. ...89 
 x
Figure 33.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
Am.....................................................................................................................89 
Figure 34.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are for the Time Average Number of 
AAAVs in the Platoon That are Operational During the Time the Platoon 
is in the Objective Area....................................................................................90 
Figure 35.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 
Response Variable is Am..................................................................................93 
Figure 36.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area.   Failure Times are 
from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 0.74 and λ = 30) with MTTF = 36 hours.  
The Total Operational Distance From Ship to Attack Objective (AO) is 
100 nm. ............................................................................................................94 
Figure 37.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs (out 
of 12) to Reach the LOD (TTS). ......................................................................98 
Figure 38.   Normal Probability Plot of Residuals Where the Response Variable is 
TTS. .................................................................................................................99 
Figure 39.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are Times Required to Get 12 AAAVs 
to the LOD (TTS). ...........................................................................................99 
Figure 40.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 
Response Variable is TTS..............................................................................100 
Figure 41.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
Mean TTS.  Plot shows possible nonnormal distribution or curvilinear 
relation between residuals..............................................................................101 
Figure 42.   Histogram of the Residuals Where the Response Variable is the Mean 
TTS. ...............................................................................................................102 
Figure 43.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
the Mean log(TTS).  Plot shows that residuals are generally 
homoscedastistic. ...........................................................................................103 
Figure 44.   Histogram of the Residuals Where the Response Variable is the Mean 
log(TTS).........................................................................................................103 
Figure 45.   Analysis of Variance When the Log of Each Observation of TTS Is Taken.104 
Figure 46.   Comparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD when the Shape 
Parameter is Varied to Change the Form of the Distribution of Failure 
Times.  All Other Factor Levels are the Same: No Log Base Used, and 
MCMT = 3 hrs. ..............................................................................................107 
Figure 47.   Comparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD when the Scale 
Parameter is Varied to Change the MTTF.  All Other Factor Levels are the 
Same: No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. ............................................108 
Figure 48.   Comparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD When the Number of 
Available Helos Varies from Large to Small.  All Other Factor Levels are 
the Same: MTTF = 36 hours, No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. .......109 
Figure 49.   Comparison of the Distribution of the Times to the LOD When MCMT is 
Varied From 1.5 Hours to 3.0 Hours.  All Other Factor Levels are the 
Same: MTTF = 72 hours, No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. .............110 
Figure 50.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Am......................................112 
 xi
Figure 51.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are the Number of AAAVs in the 
Platoon That are Operational During the Time the Platoon is in the 
Objective Area. ..............................................................................................113 
Figure 52.   Comparison of The Effects of MCMT On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of 
Six Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the 
Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 36 hours)............................................113 
Figure 53.   Comparison of The Effects of MTTF On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six 
Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the Designated 
Objective Area (shape parameter κ = 0.742, MCMT = 3 hours)...................114 
Figure 54.   Comparison of The Effects of Number of Helos On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-
Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the 
Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 36 hours with shape parameter κ = 













Table 1.   General Properties for Initial Model Runs.......................................................42 
Table 2.   Stochastic Properties for Initial Model Runs ...................................................43 
Table 3.   Moments of Time of 10 AAAVs (out of 12) to Arrive at the Beach (which 
is 25 nm away from the Ship). AAAVs were used as the towing asset...........44 
Table 4.   Moments of Time for 10 AAAVs (out of 12) to Arrive at the LOD (which 
is 25 nm away from the Beach and 50 nm from the Ship).  AAAVs were 
used as the towing asset if failures occurred from the Ship to the Beach........45 
Table 5.   All other MOEs for the initial model runs.  AAAVs used as towing asset. 
Standard error term is listed below the mean in parenthesis. ..........................59 
Table 6.   General Properties for Advanced Model Runs ................................................65 








































The reader is cautioned that the computer model developed in this thesis may not 
have been fully exercised for all cases that may be of interest.  While every effort has 
been made within the available time to ensure that the computer programs are free of 



































I would like to thank the many professors of the Operations Research department 
who readily offered their expertise and assistance whenever I needed it.  In particular I’d 
like to thank my advisors for this project, Professors Donald Gaver, Patricia Jacobs and 
Arnold Buss.  Without their vast knowledge, experience, and patience, this work could 
not have been done.  A special thanks also goes out to Johnny Limbert and J. Scott Tyo 
for their daily input and technical guidance on my work over the past year. 
Finally, and most importantly, I’d like to thank my beautiful and loving wife, 
Anne whose support and understanding has been the biggest single reason for my 







This thesis develops a simulation model to assist in the planning of Operational 
Test and Evaluation (OT&E) of the Marine Corps’ Advanced Amphibious Assault 
Vehicle (AAAV).  The AAAV is a vehicle under development that will replace the 
Marine Corps’ current amphibious assault vehicle, the AAV7-A1.  The new vehicle is 
designed to transport Marines over water and land faster, as well as to provide improved 
armor protection and fire support.   
The model simulates a platoon of AAAVs in an amphibious assault, using 
Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS) techniques, supported by elements of a 
Marine Expeditionary Unit aboard amphibious ships offshore.  The scenario has the 
platoon of AAAVs move from ship to shore, followed by a distance on land.  After 
launching from the ship, each vehicle in the platoon is subject to failures.  The times to 
failure are random and drawn independently for each vehicle from an adjustable 
distribution of times such as Exponential or Weibull.  Depending on the distribution of 
individual times to failure used, parameters that determine the mean time to failure 
(MTTF) are also adjustable.  If failures occur during the water transit phase, the vehicles 
must be towed back to the ship or to the shore (whichever is closest), either by other 
working members of the platoon, or designated auxiliary tow vehicles belonging to the 
MEU.  When the failed or quiescent vehicles are towed to their respective locations they 
are repaired if repair assets (i.e. mechanics, parts, helicopters for transport to the failed 
AAAV) are available.  Failed vehicles are subject to multiple delay times such as the time 
to locate parts and mechanics, the time to transit to where the failed vehicle is located, 
 xvii
and, of course, the time to make the repairs.  The model simulates many of these times by 
independently drawing random numbers (that represent times) from a respective 
distribution of times.  These distributions and the parameters that determine their means 
are able to be adjusted.  
Once the platoon reaches land (the specific locations of which depend on the 
scenario modeled) it waits, before proceeding, for some or all of its members to be 
repaired and rejoin the platoon if failures occurred along the way.  Because AAAVs 
operate as part of a combined amphibious and air assault force, it is vital to mission 
success that there be enough combat power provided by the AAAV platoon, and that that 
combat capability be delivered on time.  For this reason, the statistical characteristics of 
the time to get part or all of the platoon to a designated location is one of the primary 
MOEs of this thesis.   
After the platoon obtains the required number of operational vehicles at the 
designated location, it proceeds into an area designated as the objective area (OA).  The 
OA is usually several miles from a location designated as the attack objective (AO).  
Upon reaching the AO, the platoon pauses for a randomly generated period of time that is 
intended to represent conducting an attack, or carrying out some other mission.  At all 
times, the vehicles in the platoon are subject to failure.  If failures occur while the platoon 
is anywhere on the land, the MEU located offshore must provide the needed support to 
make repairs.  This can either be accomplished by delivering maintenance support via 
helo from the ships offshore, or by providing it from a logistics base inserted via LCACs 
after operational forces have been delivered by those same LCACs.  Again, many of the 
delay times associated with what happens from the time a vehicle fails to when it rejoins 
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the platoon are random.  After the time to reach a designated location has been measured 
and the platoon has entered the objective area, the ability of the platoon to maintain 
availability is measured while it conducts operations in the OA.  This MOE is simply a 
time average of the number of vehicles that are operational during the time the platoon is 
in the OA, expressed as a fraction of the total platoon. 
 The emphasis of the model is clearly on suitability issues, specifically operational 
availability, maintainability, and supportability.  As explained, the model represents the 
recovery and repair of failed AAAVs under various proposed procedures.  The focus is 
on the ability of the platoon of AAAVs to complete a mission subject to the ability of 
support assets to provide timely assistance to failed single AAAVs.  The use of 
simulation to portray the evolution of such an operation will assist decision makers in 
gaining insight into important and highly sensitive factors in the logistics procedures that, 
when changed, may have large effects on the platoon of AAAV’s ability to perform its 
mission.   
To test which factors are indeed important or sensitive, a series of factorial design 
experiments is conducted on both MOEs under different scenarios.  The factors 
considered most likely to be important are varied at different levels, while all other 
factors not explicitly tested remain constant.  Although many of these factors are held 
constant across all observations, their individual observations can be randomly 
distributed.  Each combination of factor levels is replicated over 200 simulations to 
provide a mean observation.  These factor level means are then tested for their ability to 
affect the MOEs, both statistically and, more important, practically.  These factorial 
experiments are used as a preliminary and exploratory tool for each test conducted.  
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Because using population means in factorial design experiments does not say anything 
about the variability between runs, when all factors are held constant, other tools for 
analysis are used.  These tools include histograms to plot the distribution of the 
observations of each replication, the variance between runs, and plots of the platoon’s 
availability over time.  
The results of the models show a considerable amount of sensitivity to the 
assumed form of the distribution of failure times from which a mean time to failure 
(MTTF) is calculated.  Specifically, if the distribution of times to failure allows a high or 
even moderate number of short, or otherwise known as infant failure times, balanced by 
very long failure times, it can cause large variability in the model’s measures of 
effectiveness (MOE).   
Using specific results from the model, the importance of the assumed distribution 
of failure times and the inadequacy of simply calculating a mean time to failure (MTTF) 
is illustrated:  A MTTF = 72 hours (a value within the ORD-specified threshold level for 
this operational requirement), is held constant while the form of the distribution is varied.  
This is measured for its effect on the mean time to get 12 AAAVs to a point 25 nm inland 
from the beach, which is 25 nm from the ship (50 nm total distance).  The result is a 95% 
confidence interval that runs from a short time of 2 hours (the minimum time required to 
get there) to up to over 7 hours, with individual observations of up to 50 hours.   
Another result of analysis is that the procedure by which a failed AAAV is 
rescued and repaired is an important factor.  Another factor found to be highly important 
is the mean corrective maintenance time (MCMT).  If the fact that not all failures require 
 xx
only 2nd echelon (unit level) type repairs is considered in calculating an overall MCMT, 
the effects of long, complicated repairs on the MOEs are highly significant. 
Many different scenarios are modeled; however there are likely to be many more 
important aspects of AAAV platoon operations that are not modeled or tested.  Thus, the 
intent of this thesis, beyond the analysis of the scenarios simulated, is to allow 
operational testers the ability to fully simulate specific operational tests, prior to actually 
conducting them, in order to gain insight as to what aspects of those tests are the most 
































A. GENERAL  
The Marine Corps, in an effort to improve its amphibious assault capabilities, is 
developing a new amphibious assault vehicle to replace the current, and aging 
amphibious assault platform, the Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV7-A1).  The new 
system, the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) is in many ways a 
revolutionary product, capable of much faster speed and overall mobility, and much 
improved firepower over the currently fielded system.  Along with these and other 
performance improvements, however, comes increased system complexity, which could 
make system failures more common and harder to correct.   
Before the AAAV goes into full production and fielding, it must first undergo 
rigorous and extensive testing.  Testing, specifically Operational Test and Evaluation 
(OT&E) of a new weapon system, is part of the acquisition process that determines 
whether new equipment is operationally effective and operationally suitable for the 
environment for which it was designed while being operated by typical military 
personnel.  OT&E is strictly defined and regulated by DoD procedures.  Each system 
under development has an Operational Requirements Document (ORD) which details 
what should be tested as well as how it should be evaluated.  However, even with all the 
emphasis and guidelines that there are on testing, the high cost of operational testing 
results in the testers being unable to field test every possible scenario for every 
requirement listed in the ORD.  Because of this, testers must be focused on the most 
important and highly sensitive operational issues involved with each testable 
1 
requirement.  Sensitive operational issues, or parameters, are those that, when changed 
slightly, cause subsequent, significant changes in the operational effectiveness or 
suitability of the system.  Knowing what those influential parameters are before 
conducting operational tests allows testers to make more efficient use of limited test runs 
and scenarios by combining several critical issues into single tests rather than conducting 
several tests to obtain the required data for analysis.  Modeling and Simulation can be 
used to help find these influential parameters and thus enhance the effectiveness of the 
overall acquisitions process. 
. 
B. PROBLEM 
Operational testing is designed to reveal a system’s operational sensitivities and 
their effects on mission accomplishment.  This is done by specifically testing whether or 
not the system meets the requirements listed in the ORD, with the objective of ensuring 
that the platform is able to meet or exceed the stated specifications.  However, some of 
the issues listed in the ORD may be unrealistic to test in the field.  In particular, a 
system’s maintainability and logistics supportability are hard to test realistically because 
of numerous but unavoidable artificialities in the tests.  Normally, the requirement to 
maintain a certain level of system availability is tested by examining the ability of typical 
military mechanics to make repairs, often under simulated conditions that are less than 
ideal.  However, the full logistics infrastructure that would actually provide the support in 
combat cannot be exercised in the tests because of funding constraints.  Thus, aspects 
such as the ability of the logistics support organization to maintain availability while 
providing that support from offshore and at great distances from the operating forces is 
2 
not literally examined even though this may be a highly sensitive issue that could have 
drastic effects on the AAAV’s ability to successfully complete a mission.  By simulating 
the effects of providing support under such conditions and determining the highly 
sensitive issues of providing such support, testers can have a better understanding of how 
to analyze and interpret the results of the limited, artificial tests they are able to conduct 
regarding maintainability, supportability and availability during OT&E. 
. 
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a stochastic simulation to suggest 
sensitive aspects of operating and maintaining a system of armored assault vehicles, 
specifically the Marine Corps’ new Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV), in 
order to focus its Operational Test and Evaluation.  The implemented model  simulates a 
platoon of 12 AAAVs conducting amphibious missions while being supported by 
elements of a Marine Corps Service Support Group operating in that same amphibious 
environment.  By varying input parameters and observing their effects on selected 
measures of effectiveness (MOEs), this model can help identify how vehicle failures and 
the environment in which the Marines operate affect the platoon’s maintainability, 





























A. EMPLOYMENT AND TACTICS 
Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS) is the Marine Corps’ concept for 
projecting naval power ashore in support of strategic objectives.  The concept applies 
maneuver warfare principles to the maritime portion of a theater campaign.  OMFTS 
relies on fundamental and technological advances in the capabilities and platforms of 
naval expeditionary forces today and those projected for the future. It calls for forces to 
be projected from over the horizon (OTH) to the shore and beyond as rapidly as possible.  
The key to these operations is to deceive the enemy as to intentions, forcing him into a 
mobile defense, and facilitating the achievement of tactical surprise.  This breaks the 
cohesion and integration of enemy defenses while avoiding attrition-oriented attacks.  
The main emphasis is on speed, mobility, deception, surprise and other means so as to 
confuse and create uncertainty for the enemy. 
The implementation of OMFTS is achieved through tactics known as Ship to 
Objective Maneuver (STOM).  STOM builds on many of the themes introduced in 
OMFTS such as the use of the sea as a maneuver space, sea basing the force’s logistics, 
and the elimination of the traditional beachhead.  STOM assaults use both surface and 
vertical lift platforms to launch from over the horizon to the beachhead, and beyond, to 
the objective, which could be as much as 100 miles inland.  The concept calls for the 
exploitation of navigational systems and information-sharing technologies to allow 
commanders to control the maneuver of their units from the moment they leave the 
amphibious ships to arrival at the objective.  The salient requirement of the amphibious 
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operation is the necessity to rapidly amass cohesive, tightly-coupled combat power 
ashore from distances great enough to avoid enemy detection, as well as to provide the 
Naval Task Force its needed standoff. 
The Marine Corps intends to achieve OMFTS using three types of delivery 
platforms to forcibly insert their adjustable combat unit, the Marine Air Ground Task 
Force (MAGTF).  Together these three platforms are known as the “Amphibious Triad”.  
The “Triad” is made up of the following platforms or platform types:  the new MV-22 
Osprey variable-pitch propeller aircraft, the Navy’s Landing Craft Air-Cushioned 
(LCAC), and finally, amphibious assault vehicles.  Within the concepts envisioned in 
OMFTS and STOM, the Marine Corps’ current surface platform, the present existing and 
operational Assault Amphibious Vehicle (AAV7-A1), has many shortfalls.  These 
shortfalls are outlined in Mission Area Analyses (MAAs) conducted by the Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command and are found in detail in the Operational Requirements 
Document (ORD) for the new replacement system, the AAAV.  The MAAs report that 
the AAV7-A1 has been significantly deficient during water and land operations in 
offensive and defensive firepower, water speed, land speed, agility and mobility, armor 
protection and overall system survivability.  These deficiencies gave birth to the AAAV 
program. 
 
B. THE AAAV 
A single AAAV will be capable of carrying up to 18 combat-loaded Marines (vice 
25 in the current AAV7-A1), from distances offshore of up to 45 miles, at speeds of up to 
25 knots.  Once on land, the AAAV will have the same speed and mobility as the current 
M1A1/M1A2 main battle tank.  In addition to being much faster and more mobile than 
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the current AAV7-A1, the AAAV will have a much more powerful and effective weapon 
system.  The primary weapon is a 30mm chain gun capable of destroying dismounted 
infantry or any light-armored system from a range of up to 1500 meters while on the 
move.  The gun system also includes a secondary weapon, a 7.62mm Machine Gun.   
One of the requirements of the AAAV is that it be compatible with current U.S. 
Navy Amphibious shipping.  Thus, the basic dimensions of the AAAV has to be 
comparable to the current AAV.  Therefore the AAAV’s much larger and more powerful 
engine, and larger gun turret, requires that interior space must be traded for this faster, 
more lethal system.  While the AAV7-A1 is relatively roomy inside, allowing ample 
room for the 25 troops plus each of their large packs and individual weapon systems, 
space in the AAAV is much more at a premium.  Even with 18 Marines instead of 25, 
conditions inside the AAAV are cramped, which means the Marines aboard must go into 
combat much lighter (i.e. less ammunition and gear).  Combined with the fact that the 
AAAV can cover much more ground, much more rapidly than is currently available, the 
end result is a system that is likely to need support sooner, and from a much greater 
distance.  
While this “support” can be pre-planned into the amphibious assault plan (i.e. by 
having vertical lift assets pre-loaded with critical items such as water and ammunition), 
planning for and accomplishing unscheduled maintenance is more difficult.  The AAAV 
is a much more mechanically complex system than the AAV7-A1 and thus likely to be 
more vulnerable to harsh operating conditions.  To ease the burden on its operators of 
maintaining such a complex system, most of the AAAV will consist of pull-and-replace 
subsystems.  Without having to worry about the detailed trouble-shooting of 
7 
computerized equipment, a new subsystem can be put in quickly, under combat 
conditions, and the failed subsystem then repaired in the rear using diagnostics 
equipment.  With barely enough room in the vehicle for the embarked Marines, the 
operators cannot carry any subsystems or critical spare parts on board.   
Once again the speed, range, and mobility performance feature of the AAAV 
create potential problems for its logistics support.  The Marine Corps does not have any 
support assets able to follow and keep pace with the AAAV.  Therefore almost all the 
support, planned and unplanned, must come from the MAGTF’s air assets.  Thus limited 
vertical lift assets, particularly early in the amphibious operation, when most available 
helicopters are being used to carry troops inland in a combined assault with the AAAV’s, 
becomes a critical vulnerability in the ability to support the AAAV should it incur a 
catastrophic failure.  These supportability issues as well as many others must be 
extensively tested and resolved before the first AAAV is ready for the Marines in the 
Fleet.  The following is a brief description of where the AAAV program is now in the 
acquisition process, what type of testing it must still undergo, and how the results of this 
thesis will be able to aid in the operational test and evaluation (OT&E) process. 
 
C. TEST AND EVALUATION 
At the present time (2001), the AAAV program has built three prototypes and all 
are undergoing Developmental Test and Evaluation (DT&E).  In December of 2000 the 
program went through the MILESTONE II decision process, ending the program’s 
prototype development phase.  The next (and current) phase, formerly referred to as the 
Engineering Manufacturing and Development (EMD) phase, now called the System 
Design and Demonstration phase, allows the manufacturer, General Dynamics, to begin 
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planning for and eventually executing the second half of this phase known as Low Rate 
Initial Production (LRIP).  Current and additional prototypes, and later, production 
models will undergo continuous DT&E as well as several scheduled Operational Test and 
Evaluation (OT&E) events over the next six years.  The final graduation exercise, known 
as the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation (IOT&E) event, is scheduled for the year 
2006.  This test will take place using the LRIP vehicles.  If the AAAV is found to be 
operationally effective and suitable, the program will then begin full rate production and 
fleet fielding. 
Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) is conducted to measure progress, 
usually the Effectiveness and Suitability of components and subsystems, to assist the 
engineering design and development process, and to verify attainment of technical 
performance specifications and objectives.  DT&E is normally conducted under 
controlled or laboratory conditions.  On the other hand, Operational Test & Evaluation 
(OT&E) is usually defined as a field test under realistic combat conditions for the 
purpose of determining the effectiveness and suitability of the system in combat by 
typical military users, and the evaluation of the results of such a test (DoDD 5141.2, 
1989).  OT&E is performed to ensure that, before authorizing full rate production and 
delivery of a system, the DoD has tested the product to ensure that it is operationally 
effective and operationally suitable in its intended combat environment when operated by 
typical users. 
Operational Effectiveness is defined to be the overall degree of mission 
accomplishment of a system when used by representative personnel in the environment 
9 
planned for operational employment of the system considering organization, doctrine, 
tactics, survivability, vulnerability, and threat. (DoD 5000.2R 2001) 
A system’s Operational Effectiveness is usually easier to test, because it simply 
asks, “is the system effective in performing its intended mission?”  A much more 
difficult-to-measure, and more encompassing metric, however, is Operational Suitability, 
which quantitatively assesses how well a system can be incorporated into, and supported 
by, its intended organization.  Strictly defined, Operational Suitability is the degree to 
which a system can be placed satisfactorily in field use with consideration being given to 
availability, compatibility, transportability, interoperability, reliability, wartime usage 
rates, maintainability, safety, human factors, manpower supportability, logistic 
supportability, natural environmental effects and impacts, documentation, and training 
requirements. (DoD 5000.2R 2001) 
 
D. USE OF MODELING AND SIMULATION 
Although all of the standards within the definition of Operational Suitability must 
be tested during OT&E, there are very often time and budget constraints that do not allow 
the comprehensiveness required to effectively test and evaluate each aspect of the 
suitability definition, or each “ility”, to its needed level.  A stochastic simulation designed 
to conduct sensitivity analysis on multiple input parameters can give testers insight into 
important and highly sensitive operational issues affecting Operational Suitability.  These 
issues can then guide the choice of specific field test run profiles and test scenarios.  As 
explained before, sensitive parameters are those that, when their levels change slightly, 
have relatively large and important effects on measured measures of effectiveness (MOE) 
or measures of performance (MOP). Those sensitive parameters and their corresponding 
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levels should then be physically measured in operational settings in order to make more 
likely the fielding of a new system that is fully operationally suitable.  
Some of the more difficult areas in which to operationally test a system, and are 
the focus of this thesis, are Reliability, Maintainability, Logistics Supportability, and 
Availability.  Supportability, Reliability and Maintainability are the “independent 
variables”, the measures of the factors that determine Availability (A).  For the AAAV 
platoon, availability is a quantitative measure of the number of platoon members that are 
able to perform effectively when ordered to do so for a mission of a certain length, in a 
region of operational importance.  For individual AAAV systems to be effectively 
applied in combat, it should go without saying that they must be and remain available in 
an operable condition during combat.  In order for this, the overall system (in this case a 
platoon of AAAV’s) must be reliable to the extent that it can carry out its intended 
mission over the time duration required with an acceptably high probability.  When this 
system does experience failures, the supporting organization must be able to carry out 





























A. THEORY AND BACKGROUND 
This thesis will develop methods similar to those in master’s theses by Stoneman 
(1998) and Schmidt (1999).  Both of these theses used modeling and simulation to 
identify influential parameters involved in operating and maintaining reconnaissance 
aircraft in order to aid in Operational Test and Evaluation.  Although these theses looked 
at two different types of platforms, both used the same MOE, expected time on station.  
This MOE is not literally valid for the AAAV because reconnaissance is not one of its 
missions; however, if effective time on station is translated into the time it takes a platoon 
to muster effective combat power at a specific point, or the platoon’s combat availability 
during a specific time during the mission, the evaluation is strikingly similar.  Ultimately, 
both Stoneman and Schmidt evaluated the effectiveness and suitability of a mobile 
platform that carries payload, while on a military mission.  The same methods for 
determining effectiveness and suitability can be used for the AAAV, although the 
specific MOEs and input parameters are different, and the AAAV force is made up of a 
number (12) of vehicles which may interact. 
A platoon of AAAVs in an amphibious assault should reach the stated objective 
and thus start the mission (the mission may be an attack on a known enemy location, or 
simply a “movement-to-contact” in an area where the enemy is thought to be located) 
with a certain number of vehicles in an operational state. (i.e. in working order, or, not 
failed).  With an unacceptable number of vehicles failed, and thus not available to start 
the mission, the commander might have to wait until enough of those “downed” vehicles 
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are once again operational.  This is because each AAAV in the platoon not only contains 
the firepower of its main weapon system, the turret gun, but it also contains 1/12 of the 
combat power of the infantry company embarked aboard the vehicles.  With too many 
vehicles failed, or in a quiescent state, the combat effectiveness of the platoon might be 
degraded to the point where the prudent commander would feel uncomfortable going into 
battle. 
 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF MOES 
With this in mind, the first MOE for this thesis will be the time required to launch 
an attack.  Obviously, with no failures from the time the platoon launches at the 
amphibious ship, to when it reaches the beach or the “objective area”, the time required 
to launch the attack would simply be determined by the total distance traveled, divided by 
the average speed of the platoon (time = distance/velocity). However, if too many 
vehicles fail in transit from the ship to the objective area, the time required to launch an 
attack would be dependent on other factors, such as how quickly the vehicles are able to 
be repaired in an operational environment, or how long a quiescent vehicle has to wait 
before assets can be made available to make repairs.   
Once a commander, possessing at least a minimum required number of 
operational vehicles (e.g. 8, 10, 11, or whatever the commander feels is prudent— this is 
a setting of the simulation) moves into the objective area, thus starting the “mission”, a 
secondary MOE will be the system’s (the platoon of AAAV’s) ability to maintain a 
certain level of availability during the mission.  Depending on the length of a mission and 
the size of an objective area, it could be that vehicles fail but are able to be repaired and 
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put back into operation during the mission.  Thus, in order to measure the MAGTF’s 
ability to support a platoon of AAAVs from an offshore seabase or other means, this 
secondary MOE will, more specifically, be the time-average availability of the platoon 
during a portion of the mission.  
For the purposes of this thesis, this type of measurement of availability will be 
referred to as “platoon availability” or Ap.  Ap(t) then, is simply measured as the number 
of vehicles out of the original platoon (in this case 12) that are in an operational state 
during any given instance of time t.  As AAAVs fail and are repaired then rejoin the 
platoon, Ap(t) is decreased and increased respectively.  For the 2nd MOE described above, 
Ap will be explicitly measured during the period the platoon is operating in the “objective 
area” (OA).  The time-average platoon availability or pA  is then the average number of 
AAAVs (out of the original 12) in an operational state over the duration of the “mission”.  
For the sake of clarity the 2nd MOE pA
mA
in the OA will be referred to as the “mission 




p∫+1 where s = the start of the platoon’s 
time in the objective area and t = the total time in objective area.  Finally, in order for Am 
to be expressed as a percentage of availability (out of 100%), the number from the 
equation above is divided by the number of vehicles in the platoon (12). 
Input variables can be adjusted to determine how they influence these and other 
MOEs.  Parameters such as the mean times to failure (TTF) for a single AAAV, the mean 
times to repair (TTR) for an AAAV, the method of transport for quiescent vehicles in the 
water, and many others, can be adjusted to determine their effects on the time to start the 
attack, and the Am (as defined above).  In addition to adjusting the mean TTF for 
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individual AAAVs, the form of an assumed distribution of times to vehicle failure can be 
specified and its effects on the stated MOEs analyzed.   
 
C. MODELING INDIVIDUAL AAAVS 
In order to conduct this analysis, this thesis simulates a platoon of AAAV’s in an 
amphibious environment.  Each AAAV of the platoon is modeled individually and is 
subject to failure independently of other vehicles in the platoon. The vehicles move 
together, in a tactical platoon formation until one or more of the vehicles fails and 
becomes quiescent.  At that time, the platoon loses those failed vehicles, but continues on 
until it reaches a designated “rendezvous point”, such as the beachhead or some other 
objective further inland.   
The scenarios used for this thesis focus primarily on a deployed Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU) conducting combat operations using OMFTS employment 
techniques.  A MEU generally consists of three Navy amphibious ships carrying a 
Battalion Landing Team (BLT), or a battalion sized landing force.  One company of the 
battalion is normally designated as the AAAV assault company and embarks aboard a 
platoon of 12 AAAVs for transport to the shore and objectives beyond.  The typical 
mission that is simulated calls for an OTH amphibious assault followed by an overland 
transit to objectives up to approximately 100 miles inland.  As stated above, the platoon 
of AAAVs, after launching from at least 25 nautical miles offshore, has individual 
vehicles that can fail (conditionally) independently of one another (high sea states, transit 
speed required, etc. can simultaneously induce higher failure rates for all the AAAVs that 
experience thesis environmental conditions).  Once a vehicle fails, the platoon loses that 
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vehicle’s firepower as well as the Marines it carries, and thus the system’s (the platoon’s) 
Ap(t) is decreased.  The Ap(t) is not increased again until the repaired AAAV has re-
joined the platoon.  This measurement of mission availability requires a different and 
generalized assessment of down time, and how it affects individual vehicle availability, 
than is traditionally used.  
The MOE, Operational Availability (Ao), is used to measure the percentage of 
time that a piece of equipment or a system is capable of performing its designated 
mission.  The usual definition of Operational Availability (Ao) is: TBM/(TBM + TDT).   
Where TBM = mean time between unscheduled maintenance actions, and TDT = mean 
total down time.  Total down time is usually further broken down into mean Time To 
Repair (TTR) and mean Administrative and Logistics Delay Time (ALDT).  This 
relationship of TDT and its component times is intended to provide a simple measure of 
equipment availability when the equipment is deployed and functioning in a combat 
environment.  However, this definition of Ao often only applies to a single piece of 
equipment and is also a long-run average time the piece of equipment is up.  This thesis 
will be concerned with the time average measure of availability for the platoon of 
AAAVs being modeled.  As stated above, however, the new, more customized term Ap 
has been created for this thesis.  The above discussion of individual Ao is provided, 
however, because the model will simulate each AAAV individually and each AAAV’s 
Ao will affect the Ap. 
Note:  Ao is most appropriate for a machine that is in constant operation and 
alternates between being operative or “up” or inoperative and “down”.  Certain items 
such as weapons, sensors, or communications equipment should also be tested after 
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experiencing rigorous transport (i.e. in an AAAV).  These effects, however, are not 
modeled explicitly in this thesis. 
Another difference between a model that uses Ao, and this model is that, in this 
model, the time starting from when the vehicle fails to the time it rejoins its platoon is 
considered total down time.  This is a longer period of time than that in a model using Ao 
in which an individual system is considered available again immediately after it is 
repaired.   This modified measure of total down time for each vehicle is needed because 
the platoon, along with the company of Marines it is transporting, acts as a single combat 
unit.   Thus, it is re-emphasized, a recently-repaired AAAV operating independent of the 
platoon does not positively affect Ap(t) until it re-joins the platoon. The following is an 
explanation of the various failure-repair scenarios that can be expected, and thus will be 
modeled in this thesis. 
 
D. BASIC SIMULATION SCENARIOS 
The AAAV is considered a multi-mission system, so the assessment of Ap 
requires detailed techniques to characterize the associated mission states corresponding to 
different failure-repair scenarios.  For instance, if an AAAV fails during its amphibious 
phase, it must be towed back to the ship, or ashore by another AAAV, or, if such assets 
are available, a designated tow vehicle.   This effectively reduces the average speed of the 
two platforms dramatically and doubles the decrease in the platoon’s availability (in the 
case where another AAAV must be used for towing). Ap(t) is decreased when an AAAV 
fails, and again when a second AAAV must stop and tow the failed vehicle. 
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 Note:  The simulation will model the towing of quiescent vehicles with 
operational AAAVs but will also be able model a different scenario where Navy LCUs 
are used to transport quiescent vehicles to the ship or shore.  These auxiliary vehicles, 
when modeled are not subject to failure when towing.  AAAVs towing other AAAVs are 
subject to failure.   
This forced slow towing movement allows the remainder of the platoon to gain 
that much more distance on the two effectively degraded vehicles (or in the second case, 
just the one quiescent vehicle when LCUs are used to tow), thus increasing the time until 
the platoon’s Ap(t) is increased by a return of an AAAV.  A failure in the amphibious 
phase of an operation leads to one of the two failure-repair (water) scenarios, depending 
on how far away the AAAV is from the ship when it fails in the water.  A third scenario 
occurs after a vehicle has successfully made the transit from ship to shore.  
In the first scenario, the vehicle fails relatively close to the ship after launch, so 
that it is easier to tow the disabled vehicle back to the ship.   In this case, the vehicle 
enters what can be considered a “repair queue” as soon as it gets back to the ship.  The 
time in the queue, in this case, is considered ALDT, and is measured as the time from 
when the AAAV returns to the ship, until mechanics can be made available for making 
the repairs.  Once parts, tools and mechanics are located, repairs begin and continue until 
the vehicle is operationally capable again. This portion of down time is the Time To 
Repair (TTR).  After the vehicle is repaired, it re-launches and attempts to re-join the 
platoon. Again, even though the vehicle has been successfully repaired, the platoon’s 
Ap(t) is still not increased.  The repaired vehicle must then make its way back to rejoin 
the platoon.  In effect, to the platoon, a vehicle is considered “down” until it has rejoined 
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the ranks.  This time from repair to re-join will simply be called Return Time (RT).  Thus 
for the purposes of this thesis, down time is comprised of three sub-elements:  ALDT, 
TTR, and RT.  This first scenario is described visually below in Figure 1.   
Figure 1.   Event Graph of Failure-Repair Scenario 1 
 
Figure 1 above, is known as an Event Graph.  Event Graphs are used as a way of 
graphically representing discrete event simulation models.  For this thesis, Figure 1 and 
the other Event Graphs used in this section are graphical paradigms that model the events 
described in each basic simulation scenario into event list logic (Buss 1996). 
The next two scenarios and their respective Event Graphs become increasingly 
more complicated.  When an AAAV fails while conducting an amphibious assault using 
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OTH and STOM tactics, the logistics system that supports the mechanized platoon is 
located on the ship from which the AAAVs launched.  If the failure occurs too far away 
from the ship to make Scenario 1 feasible, the support for making repairs must go to the 
downed AAAV.  The part(s) that is (are) needed for the repair must be determined, and 
the part(s) and mechanics on the ship must be located, and be free to participate in the 
repairs, otherwise the vehicle must wait.  A vertical lift asset (helicopter) is then 
launched, if available, to rescue the downed vehicle.  This portion of time, for this 
particular situation, can be considered ALDT.  If multiple tasks are being assigned to a 
limited number of vertical lift assets, there may not be a helicopter immediately available 
for the repair mission.  This could add substantially to ALDT.  Since ALDT also includes 
the transit time from the ship to the vehicle, the distance the AAAV is from the ship when 
it fails will also have a substantial effect.   
Once the helicopter reaches the AAAV (provided it is not attrited along the way), 
the mechanics must either repair the problem or replace the subsystem (all diagnostics of 
the failure and the required repair is assumed to be perfect).  This portion of down time 
for this situation is the Time To Repair (TTR).  Then, once again, even when the vehicle 
has been successfully repaired, the platoon’s availability is still not increased—this 
occurs only when the AAAV has re-joined the platoon after the required RT.   
After repairing the vehicle the helicopter must then return to the ship, be refueled 
and possibly undergo some maintenance before it is ready to be launched again in support 
of another downed vehicle, or some other need such as resupply or evacuation of 
casualties.  It is likely that, if many missions are demanded of a limited number of 
vertical lift assets, there will be long periods of time during which no helicopters are 
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available, leading to long delays in the repair queue and causing long ALDT times for 
newly failed vehicles.  This kind of event could induce periods in which the platoon is 
inoperative, waiting for enough vehicles to be repaired before proceeding.  
For the above problem description, several possible simulation scenarios can be 
derived.  Two are now described.  In what we will call Scenario 2, the failure again 
occurs in the water.  This time, however, the failed vehicle is closer to the beach, and is 
towed there by another AAAV, or transported by an LCU vehicle.  At the time the 
AAAV fails, a helo is launched from the ship (if one is available), to the beach (where the 
downed AAAV is headed) in order to make the needed repairs.  In Scenario 3, the failure 
occurs after the AAAV has reached the beach.  No “tow vehicle” is needed now, but, just 
as in Scenario 2, a helo must be launched from the ship to deliver the needed repair parts 
and mechanics.  Figures 2 and 3 below visually describe Scenarios 2 and 3 respectively.  
During the course of the simulation, each failure of an AAAV could trigger one of these 
first three basic scenarios.  Which scenario is carried out is based on the location of the 
AAAV when it fails. 
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  Figure 2.   Event Graph of Failure-Repair Scenario 2 
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E. MODELING MORE COMPLICATED SCENARIOS 
The three scenarios explained above are important, and in many cases, realistic 
situations to consider.  They will be investigated in the Results section of this thesis.  
However, these three scenarios stop short, in many ways, of accurately modeling the 
MEU and the environment in which AAAVs might be called to operate in.  The above 
three scenarios should be considered basic templates.  They represent the basic 
methodology that the overall model is based on.  Additional scenarios will build off these 
templates, but the basic determinations of availability states for individual AAAVs will 
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not change.  Each AAAV, upon failure, will be subject to ALDT, TTR, and RT before 
being able to rejoin the platoon and thus affect Ap(t).  Additional scenarios, building off 
the three basic templates, will attempt to model a MEU conducting an amphibious assault 
as accurately as possible.  The following discussion explains these “reality 
enhancements”.   
 A MEU possesses a limited number of vertical lift assets (normally 12 CH-46 
helicopters and 5 CH-53 helicopters—the MV-22 will eventually replace the CH-46, it is 
assumed, at a rate of one-for-two). At roughly the same time the AAAV platoon 
launches, a majority of the MEU’s air assets (about 70% of the total number) is needed to 
transport the air-assault echelon (one company of the battalion landing team (BLT)) to 
the objective.  Until the air-assault echelon returns from delivering its Marines to the 
objective, there is probably only about two or three helos available for logistics recovery 
missions.  When the air assault echelon returns, only then is there an ample number of 
helicopters standing by for logistics rescue missions.  The simulation, therefore, models 
an air assault echelon with an adjustable number of helos that launch with the AAAVs in 
a combined air and amphibious assault.  The helos fly to a designated landing zone (LZ), 
pause to offload the Marines they carry, and then fly back to the ship.  Once back on the 
ship, they must be refueled and serviced, just as after any flight, before they are 
designated as “ready” for logistics rescue missions.  The refuel times are random, 
independently distributed with distribution of times and their parameters adjustable. 
Another level of reality that appears in the simulation is the fact that a MEU 
begins amphibious operations with a finite (limited) number of vertical lift assets.  Helos, 
particularly ones operating in a STOM environment where pockets of enemy resistance 
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may be bypassed, are very vulnerable to shoulder-fired (or otherwise) surface-to-air 
missiles (SAMs).  Therefore, before starting a simulation, a level of helo vulnerability (a 
probability of helo attrition) is adjusted from zero to 100%.  All helo flights are then 
subject to attrition by enemy forces when they enter the area designated as hostile.  Each 
flight, upon entering the hostile area, is subject to a simple probability that it is shot 
down, regardless of the time in flight it spends. 
Finally, it may the case that a MEU commander does not want to put the full 
burden of logistics support on his vertical lift assets, particularly when the MEU deploys 
with various types of trucks for the purpose of providing logistics support on the ground.  
Navy LCACs could eventually be used to transport these truck assets to the beach in 
order to establish a mobile logistics base ashore, specifically for the purpose of 
supporting the AAAV platoon.  Just as with the vertical lift assets, however, initially, the 
LCACs are needed to deliver the mechanized company ashore, or those Marines aboard 
LAAVs.  Therefore, before a mobile log base can be established ashore, the LCACs must 
first deliver the MEU’s other mechanized assets ashore, then return to the ships and load 
the logistics assets, then deliver them ashore, when it is deemed safe enough to do so.  
Once ashore, however, all logistics support for the AAAV platoon is provided by the 
mobile log base.  This scenario can become even more complicated if only some of the 
needed repair parts are delivered ashore.  In some cases (the simulation allows an 
adjustable probability of a repair part being with the log base) the log base would have to 
call back to the ship for a needed part to be delivered via helo before being able to 
conduct repairs.  If no helos are immediately available, then, once again, ALDT is likely 
to be greatly affected.  As is the case with normal logistics doctrine, the mobile log base 
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maintains a designated standoff distance from the operating forces.  LCAC load and 
unload times are random with adjustable distributions and parameters.  The LCACs start 
the simulation loaded with assault force equipment (i.e. Tanks or LAAVs).  They travel 
from ship to shore just like the AAAV platoon.  Once on shore they unload the 
equipment aboard, then return to the ship.  Depending on the number of round trips 
necessary to deliver ashore all assault equipment, the logistics base equipment is then 
loaded and brought to shore.   
The capability to add the above-described levels of reality to the three basic 
scenario templates does exists in the simulation model for this thesis.   Stochastically 
Modeling these first three basic scenarios, as well as the other, more complicated and 
realistic ones, effectively represents, within the context of the AAAV’s designated 
mission, the way in which each platform’s reliability affects the MAGTF’s ability to 
support a platoon of AAAVs.  The effectiveness of the support, constrained by the 
operational environment, ultimately determines the platoon’s availability (Ap) at any 
given time t, or its Ap(t).  This information can be used to determine whether or not the 
platoon is able to proceed on to the objective, or whether it has to wait in order to re-build 
combat power.   Likewise, simulating an operation that lasts for a relatively long period 
of time, and has a large objective area, will further allow the model to generate situations 
that could have major effects on the capability of a Service Support Group to provide 
adequate support.  The Service Support Group is defined as the logistics command 
structure and all its available assets for logistical support of the MAGTF.  If a large 
number of constraints are placed on these limited assets at once, it could drive the 
platoon’s Ap down sharply during the mission, when it is needed most, and affecting Am.  
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The purpose of the three MOEs (time to the beach (TTB), time to start an attack 
(TTS) and Am) is to quantitatively answer the question, “is the equipment available in 
working condition when it is needed?”  Using Ap(t) as a basis for these two MOEs 
supports the establishment of reliability, maintainability and logistics supportability 
parameters and trade-offs between these parameters.  Availability is itself a summary 
parameter that translates system reliability, maintainability and logistics supportability 
characteristics into an index of effectiveness.  The objective of this thesis is to develop a 
useful model that simulates possible scenarios in order to assess Ap and how it affects the 
platoon’s ability to start an attack in a timely manner, and maintain combat power once in 
an objective area by conducting sensitivity analysis on varying levels of basic input 
parameters.  The overall purpose is to guide data acquisition and analysis during the 
OT&E process. 
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IV.  MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
A.  GENERAL 
In order to assess the stated MOEs, a simulation of an amphibious attack 
conducted by a MAGTF located aboard Navy amphibious assault ships is created.  The 
model is developed as a stochastic, event-driven computer simulation, the objective of 
which is to represent an operation that sends a platoon of AAAVs from an amphibious 
ship (seabase) at a specified distance offshore to one or several objectives via specifiable 
waypoints.  While in transit from the ship to the objectives, the AAAVs are subject to 
mission-affecting failures.  This simulation is focused primarily on assessing the time it 
takes to get a certain number of AAAVs to a specified location, which is affected by 
reliability, maintainability and supportability.  Furthermore, during a mission the 
simulation assesses the platoon’s ability to maintain an average level of availability.  
Attrition of AAAVs by enemy action is not modeled.   This assumption is unrealistic, but 
conservative in that its adoption in the models tends to stress the maintenance-logistics 
system maximally. 
 
B. MODEL CLASSES AND THEIR DESCRIPTIONS 
 The model is programmed in Java using the simulation package Simkit, 
developed by Arnold Buss and Kirk Stork (Stork, 1997).  The model consists of the 
following Java classes: 







6. Amphibious Ship 
7. Mover Manager 
8. Failure Manager 
9. Flight Manager 
10. Random Pause Generators 
11. Platoon Manager 
12. Log Base Manager 
13. Failure Dispatcher 
14. Land Repair Process 
15. Land Repair Process (Log Base) 
16. Beach Repair Process 
17. Ship Repair Process 
18. Tow Manager 
19. Tow LCU Manager 
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1.  Entity Classes 
The entity classes consist of the AAAV, LCAC, LCU, Helo, Ship, and Truck 
classes.  These classes store information pertaining to the individual vehicles.  All entities 
are given their speed, current locations, and vehicle numbers when they are created.  In 
addition, some vehicles, such as AAAVs and Helos, temporarily store information such 
as what Helo is assigned to what AAAV in a rescue situation.  When an AAAV fails, that 
AAAV’s entity class records the time it fails.  When it is repaired and rejoins the platoon, 
the entity class for that AAAV records the time it is once again operational.  These 
“recordings” are sent to various Manager Classes that store the information.  When a 
Helo, or Truck is conducting a logistics rescue, it is designated to the Manager Classes as 
“unavailable” until it returns and is refueled and deemed ready for another mission.  At 
that time, the Manager classes classify these entities as “available”.  
The Ship Class is one of the most important entity classes.  It stores information 
about the number of helos the MAGTF has, to include helos used in the air assault, as 
well as the dedicated logistics helos.  The Ship Class also maintains the number of 
LCACs, and LCUs, in the simulation.   
2.  Mover Managers 
The AAAV Platoon Mover Manager Class is given the ship’s location, the 
location of the beachhead that the platoon is to assault, and the location of the platoon’s 
inland objectives.  This class controls all the movement of the overall platoon, and is not 
concerned with failures.  If vehicles in the platoon fail, the Mover Manager continues the 
mission with the remainder of the platoon.  In addition to the AAAV Platoon Mover 
Manager, there are multiple mover managers, each controlling the movement of the 
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different MEU assets (i.e. Helos, LCACs, LCUs, etc.).  Once a Mover Manager reaches 
one of the designated “waypoints” in its list of locations to travel to, it triggers an 
“Arrival” Event.  The Arrival Event allows the Mover Managers and the Random Pause 
Generators interact.   
 3.  Random Pause Generators 
Once a Mover Manager reaches a waypoint the corresponding Random Pause 
Generator hears the event “Arrival” and schedules an event “Pause Complete” if a pause 
is needed.  Each Mover Manager has an associated Random Pause Generator.  In some 
cases, (for the Platoon’s Mover Manager) the Time To Reach the Beach (TTB) or the 
Time to Start the Attack (TTS), two of the simulation’s primary MOEs, are measured and 
recorded by the Random Pause Generators.  If, upon arriving at the waypoint designated 
as the Beach or the LOD, the Ap is not at a (predetermined and adjustable) level, the 
Random Pause class will hold the platoon at that waypoint until the Ap(t) changes enough 
times to get the Ap at the “acceptable” level.  At that time the Random Pause Generator 
schedules the “Pause Complete” Event and record the simulation time for the TTB or 
TTS calculation.  The reason these classes are referred to as “Random” Pause Generators 
is, at other times, the Random Pause Generator associated with its given Mover Manager, 
schedules the Pause Complete event based on a draw of time using a random number 
generator and specified distribution for the pause time. 
3.  Manager & Process Classes  
The Manager and Process Classes are where most of the simulation takes place.  
There are many Manager Classes that perform a number of tasks and all of them, in one 
way or another, interact with the Process Classes to move the simulation along.  The 
following is a general discussion of how this works.   
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The distributions and the parameters of the failure times of the AAAVs are 
controlled by the Failure Manager.  When the simulation begins, this class gives each 
AAAV in the platoon (stored in its corresponding AAAV Class) a failure time based on 
an independent randomly generated number.  Once an AAAV experiences a mission-
affecting failure at time t, its movement is stopped and the Platoon Manager decrements 
the platoon’s Ap(t).  The Failure Dispatcher Class then gets the location of the failed 
AAAV and assigns an appropriate Repair Process based on that location.  If the vehicle is 
in the water, the Failure Dispatcher determines whether the AAAV is closer to the ship or 
the beachhead, and assigns either the Ship Repair Process or the Beach Repair Process.  
If the platoon already reaches the beach before the at-sea AAAV’s failure time elapses, 
the Failure Dispatcher assigns the Land Repair Process, unless the simulation includes 
the use of a mobile log base.   
If the simulation includes the mobile log base, the Failure Dispatcher checks the 
Log Base Manager to see if the LCACs have delivered the logistics assets ashore yet.  
Until the log base is established, all repairs must be serviced via helicopter.  Each Repair 
Process is modeled according to Figures 1, 2 and 3, shown above except in the case 
where a mobile log base is established.  If the mobile log base is being established, when 
repairs are relegated to the Repair Process Land (Log Base), this class gets the “standoff” 
distance from the log base to the platoon from the Platoon Manager class.  It then uses 
this distance to compute the time it takes to deliver parts and mechanics to the downed 
AAAV from the Log Base.  The Log Base Manager also uses a random number generator 
to determine whether the part that is needed for repairs is in fact present at the mobile log 
base (this is a simple random draw—the numbers of each part are not explicitly modeled 
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since types of failures are not explicitly modeled).  If it is not, the Repair Process Land 
(Log Base) asks the Ship class if there is an available helo.  If there is, a helo is 
dispatched to fly the needed part to the log base.  If a helo is not available, then the repair 
must wait.  Finally, the Log Base Manager maintains the number of available trucks and 
before the Repair Process Land (Log Base) Class can assign a repair-rescue, there must 
be available trucks for the job.   
As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Amphibious Ship class, among other 
things, stores the number of available helicopters.  In order for the Land Repair Process 
and Beach Repair Process to be completed (or for a needed part to be delivered to the 
Log Base), the Amphibious Ship must have helicopters available.  If there are no 
helicopters available at the time one is requested, that repair job (associated with one of 
the AAAV Classes) is placed in a queue to wait for resources to be made available.    The 
Flight Manager Class records all flights that leave and return to the amphibious ship.  It 
records the flight hours for individual helos and then that information is sent to the 
individual Helo Class and stored.  Another task of the Flight Manager Class is to 
determine whether or not a helo is shot down when it enters a designated “hostile” area in 
its flight path.  This is determined by a simple random draw from a uniform distribution:  
if the number drawn is less than the probability (p) of attrition, the helo is destroyed. 
One of the Mover Managers for the assault helicopter squad informs the Ship 
class when the air assault echelon has returned.  At that time, the helos used for the 
assault are then added to the number of helos available for logistics purposes.  At any 
time when a helo completes its mission (whatever that mission may be), or also, in the 
case of trucks in the mobile log base, when a truck completes its mission, a check is made 
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to see if there are any AAAVs waiting in the queue for a transportation asset to become 
available is made.  If there are AAAVs in the queue, the job is sent back to the Failure 
Dispatcher Class for a determination of the Process Class to whom the job should be 
assigned.  
The Tow Manager class, used by the Ship Repair Process and the Beach Repair 
Process, assigns another vehicle (AAAV) from the platoon to tow an AAAV disabled in 
the water.  If the simulation is using LUCs for towing, it assigns one of the limited 
number of available LCUs.  Once the functional AAAV has towed the downed AAAV, 
either to the beach or the ship, it is returned to the Platoon Manager class where a 
distance calculation is made to the current location of the platoon.  This distance is then 
used to calculate a return time (RT), which the AAAV uses to schedule its re-joining of 
the platoon.  Immediately after being repaired, the AAAV is, once again, subject to 
failure.  When an LCU is used, the LCU will be sent back to a designated mid-sea station 
area.  The Platoon Manager also takes the AAAVs that have completed the appropriate 
Repair Process and sends them back to the platoon in the same manner.  The changes in 
Ap(t) are also tracked and recorded by the Platoon Manager Class. 
4.  Data Collection and Data Collection Classes  
 As stated above, the model represents the platoon’s availability at specific times, 
and the time it takes to proceed into the objective area with a pre-specified acceptable 
level of availability.  The model has a designated line of departure (LOD).  When the 
Mover Manager reaches the LOD, it checks the platoon’s availability.  If it is below a 
specified level, the platoon waits until enough repaired vehicles rejoin the platoon to get 
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availability back to acceptable levels.  The time is recorded when the platoon proceeds 
into the objective area. 
In addition to the time to cross the Beach and/or LOD, the model will monitor the 
Ap(t) of the AAAV platoon throughout the on-land operation as well as other useful 
metrics such as down time, delay in the repair queue, and number of available helos per 
mission.  The Random Pause Generator Class for the AAAV Platoon informs the Platoon 
Manager Class when the platoon has enteres the “objective area” (OA).  At that time the 
Platoon Manager Class explicitly measures each Ap(t) for use in calculating Am.  The 
measurement is taken using a “Time Varying” type of statistic.  Essentially it records the 
Ap(t) at the time of each “failure” event and “return” event and records the times between 
the events. The Simple Data Logger class collects the initial number of AAAVs to arrive 
at the beach, the LOD and the Objective for every replication in the simulation for use in 
creating histograms of the distribution of the initial numbers of AAAVs upon arrival at 
those locations.  The Time Collector uses an adjustable time-step length, to take 
measurements of Ap during the time the platoon is in the objective area.  The observation 
of Ap is averaged over all the replications for each time-step value.  The output from the 
Time Collector class provides a view of Ap(t) for a designated t (i.e. every minute, or ten 
minutes, or hour, etc) during the time the platoon is in the objective area.   
 
C.   ADJUSTABLE PARAMETERS AND SIMULATION SETTINGS 
The following is a list of current input parameters for the simulation: 
Adjustable Parameters: 
1. AAAV speed over land 
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2. AAAV speed over water 
3. AAAV speed when towing another AAAV in the water 
4. Number of AAAVs 
5. Sea transit distance 
6. Number of waypoints and their location (required objectives for the mission) 
for AAAVs 
7. Number of waypoints and their location for the assault helo squad 
8. Number of waypoints and their location for the LCUs 
9. Location of the LOD 
10. Location of the Beach Head 
11. Distribution of operational pause times at each waypoint (objective) and its 
parameters.  Possibilities are Uniform, Triangular, Weibull, etc.  (All 
adjustable distributions have same possibilities.) 
12. Threat vulnerability (probability of helos being shot down) 
13. Distribution of repair times and their parameters 
14. Distribution of failure times and their parameters 
15. Number of dedicated logistics support helicopters 
16. Number of helos in the assault echelon 
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17. Distribution of Logistics delay time and its parameters (time to detect/isolate a 
failure and relay need back to ship + time to get parts/maintenance personnel 
on helo).   
18. Distribution of refuel time and its parameters once helo returns to ship, before 
it is ready for re-launch.   
19. Speed of logistics helicopter 
20. Number of operational pauses (i.e. if the platoon pauses to build up combat 
power once at the LOD only, or twice: at the beach and at the LOD) 
21. Whether or not a mobile log base will be placed ashore 
22. Number of trips the LCACs will have to make before the log base can be 
delivered 
23. LCAC speed 
24. Number of Trucks in the Mobile Log Base 
25. Speed of Trucks 
26. Distribution of refuel time and its parameters once truck returns to the log 
base, before it is ready for re-launch 
27. Distribution of Logistics delay time and its parameters (time to detect/isolate a 
failure & relay need back to log base + time to get parts/maintenance 
personnel on truck) 
28. Standoff distance between mobile log base and AAAV platoon 
29. Probability that parts needed for repair will be at the mobile log base 
38 
30. Whether or not towing of downed AAAVs will be conducted by other 
AAAVs or LCUs 
31. Speed of LCUs 
32. Number of LCUs 
33. Distribution of times and their parameters for the length of time it takes for 
one AAAV to hook up to another before it can begin towing 
The simulation models the effects of these input parameters on the MOEs (listed 
above) for each mission.  Each run of the simulation is considered to be one mission.  
Ultimately this simulation could be used as a tool by OT&E agencies to answer the 
question, “which aspects of operation, maintenance, and logistics support most 
sensitively affect the ability of the platoon of AAAV’s to perform the mission?”  
According to the ORD, the acceptable level of availability, for any size unit, to 
successfully perform its mission, and thus be considered operationally suitable is 81%.  
One assumption of this simulation is that prior to a deployment, and to a greater degree, 
prior to an operation, the MAGTF would dedicate the bulk of its efforts to ensuring that 
all AAAVs within the platoon are mission-capable.  Thus the model will assume that the 
availability of the platoon is 100% at the start of the simulation, and furthermore, that the 
AAAVs are as good as new.  After the start of a mission, however, it is assumed that 
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V.  RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
A.   INITIAL SIMULATION RUNS USING A SIMPLE MODEL WITH 
EXTREME PARAMETER VALUES 
Although the model is capable of simulating much more complicated scenarios, 
this section presents results of model runs that are, in many ways, oversimplified.  Many 
of the variables that have the capability of being stochastic are set equal to constants, and 
many of the other settings, such as the number of support equipment (i.e. helicopters and 
LCU craft) are made to be arbitrarily large so as to make their supply essentially 
unlimited.  These simplifications are made to focus attention on the extreme sensitivity of 
the model to failure times and the form of the assumed distribution of times to failure.  
Additionally, the model is simplified so that simpler model calculations can be made and 
compared to the results of this model.   
The factors’ mean time to failure (MTTF) and the distribution of the failure times 
have the greatest effects, by far, on the model’s MOEs.  This is because it is the MTTF 
and the shape of the distribution of failure times together that determine how often 
failures occur.  Because of this, the focus of these initial model runs will be to show the 
effects of reliability growth and the effects of different failure distributions.  Therefore 
the MTTF and the distribution of failure times will be the model’s only stochastic factors.  
All other factors will be held constant.  This can and will change in future explorations 
conducted in the second half of this chapter.   
Note:  This model is capable of making many of its factors stochastic, and thus 
have their times be random variables drawn from a specified distribution with specified 
parameters.  As explained, however, for these first model runs, all factors other than the 
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MTTF and the Failure Distribution will be of type constant variate.  Individual failure 
times are random.  The model settings for the following output and analysis are as 
follows: 
General Property Value Comments 
Number AAAVs 12 
AAAV Avg Speed 25 (kts)  
AAAV Avg Tow Speed 5 (kts) 
Number LCUs 10 Allows for “unlimited” 
number of tow support 
LCU Speed 8 (kts) 
LCU Tow Speed 4 (kts) 
Number LCACs 2 
LCAC Speed 40 (kts) 
Number LCAC trips needed 
prior to Log Base Delivery 
1 
Total Number of Helos 31 Allows for "unlimited 
number of helo support 
Number Assault Helos 10 Delivers Air Assault 
Company 
Helo Avg Speed 120 (kts) 
Probability of Helo Attrition 0.0 
Number of AAAVs needed 
to proceed 
10 Platoon stops at Beach 
and/or LOD until this 
number of functioning 
AAAVs is present 
Stop at Beachhead Yes 
Stop at LOD Yes 
Method of towing AAAVs 
used 
AAAV/LCU Varied so that comparisons 
can be made 
Table 1.   General Properties for Initial Model Runs 
 
Stochastic Property Distribution Parameters Comments 




Repair Times Constant 2 hrs 
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Stochastic Property Distribution Parameters Comments 
Prep Times for Helos Constant 0 hrs Time b/w rescue 
mission assigned to 
helo and helo 
departure 
Refuel Times for 
Helos 
Constant 0 hrs 
ALDT Constant 0 hrs For AAAV repairs 
made on ship only 
Time to Commence 
Towing 
Constant 1 hr Time from failure to 
start of tow action 
(AAAVs only) 
Pause at Attack 
Objective 
Constant 8 hrs Simulated length of 
"attack" 
Table 2.   Stochastic Properties for Initial Model Runs 
 
Using the settings listed above in Tables 1 and 2, the model is run with MTTF 
settings from 3 to 36 (with the MTTF doubling each time).  Each of these MTTF cases 
uses both an Exponential Distribution for the Failure Times, as well as a Mixed 
Exponential Distribution.  The Mixed Exponential distributions for each MTTF are given 
a 50% chance of having an infant failure time (exact parameter settings for the Mixed 
Exponential distribution are shown on the tables of output data).  Tables 3 and 4 below 
show the output of these runs for the MOEs Time to Beach (TTB) and Time to the LOD, 
or otherwise known as Time to Step-off (TTS).  Table 3 shows the results of the model 
runs for the first MOE, TTB, while Table 4 shows the results for the second MOE, TTS.   
AAAVs were used as the towing asset for other quiescent AAAVs in the water for the 
below observations.  As indicated in the tables, each mean and standard error observation 
is calculated using 200 replications with the same property settings. 
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Distribution of Time To Failure Reps Time to 




to Arrive at 
B 
Std Error 
of Time to 
Arrive at B
(hours) (hours) (hours) 
Exp Mean 3 200 1.0 10.932 0.451
Exp Mean 6 200 1.0 4.223 0.230
Exp Mean 9 200 1.0 2.610 0.162
Exp Mean 18 200 1.0 1.541 0.100
Exp Mean 36 200 1.0 1.098 0.042
Mixed Exp Mean 3   
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5  
200 1.0 13.939 0.509
Mixed Exp Mean 6 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/11 
200 1.0 8.286 0.227
Mixed Exp Mean 9 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/17 
200 1.0 7.653 0.210
Mixed Exp Mean 18 
p=0.5; λ1=1/30, λ2=1/6 
200 1.0 2.477 0.164
Mixed Exp Mean 36 
p=0.5; λ1=1/60, λ2=1/12 
200 1.0 1.373 0.079
Table 3.   Moments of Time of 10 AAAVs (out of 12) to Arrive at the Beach (which 
is 25 nm away from the Ship). AAAVs were used as the towing asset. 
 
 





to Arrive at 
LOD 
Std Error 
of Time to 
Arrive at 
LOD 
(hours) (hours) (hours) 
Exp Mean 3 200 2.0 21.297 0.693
Exp Mean 6 200 2.0 7.712 0.264
Exp Mean 9 200 2.0 4.824 0.196
Exp Mean 18 200 2.0 2.922 0.116
Exp Mean 36 200 2.0 2.264 0.066
Mixed Exp Mean 3 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5 
200 2.0 24.766 0.760
Mixed Exp Mean 6 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/11 
200 2.0 12.064 0.302
Mixed Exp Mean 9 
p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/17 
200 2.0 10.348 0.239
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to Arrive at 
LOD 
Std Error 
of Time to 
Arrive at 
Failures) LOD 
Mixed Exp Mean 18 
p=0.5; λ1=1/30, λ2=1/6 
200 2.0 4.501 0.182
Mixed Exp Mean 36 
p=0.5; λ1=1/60, λ2=1/12 
200 2.0 2.751 0.103
Table 4.   Moments of Time for 10 AAAVs (out of 12) to Arrive at the LOD (which 
is 25 nm away from the Beach and 50 nm from the Ship).  AAAVs were used as the 
towing asset if failures occurred from the Ship to the Beach. 
  
From the results of Tables 3 and 4 above, it is clear that the model indicates 
extreme sensitivity to changing the MTTF as well as to the form of the time to failure.  
This is especially true in the water transit phase of the amphibious operation (as the 
results of Table 3 show), when failures create a need to tow the quiescent AAAVs to the 
ship or the shore before repairs can be made.  Failure times from a Mixed Exponential 
distribution, where a high probability of infant failure occurs, clearly create more failures 
in the water, and thus significantly increase the time it takes to get at least 10 AAAVs on 
the beach and in working condition.  Figure 4, below, offers a better illustration of the 












3.0 6.0 9.0 18.0 36.0













Figure 4.   Comparison of Mean Times for At Least 10 of 12 AAAVs to Reach the 
Beach at Various MTTF When Different Forms of the Distribution of Failure Times are 
Used (AAAVs used as the towing asset)  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential are the 
same as in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
Next the towing asset is changed from AAAVs to LCUs.  Now, when failures 
occur in the water phase of the amphibious assault, LCUs from the amphibious ships tow 
the quiescent AAAVs to shore.  Other than changing the method of towing, all other 
settings are identical to those in the above data runs.   Figure 5 below shows the effects 
on the MOE, mean TTB when the tow assets and the failure times are varied.  For 
extremely low mean times to failure (3 hours up to 36 hours MTTF), it is observed that 
using LCUs, or some other auxiliary craft for towing, other than non-failed AAAVs in 
the platoon, decreases the times to reach the beach for the platoon.  This is mainly 
because, if other AAAVs in the platoon have to be used for towing quiescent AAAVs 
there are twice as many AAAVs absent from the portion of the platoon that is still 
operational.  Using LCUs allows as many working AAAVs as possible to get to the 
beach.  Figure 5 shows the observed differences between mean times to the beach when 
failure times and the method of towing are varied.  The failure times are all from the 
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exponential distribution, however, the same general differences between tow methods are 
observed (at the same mean times to failure) for the Mixed Exponential distribution as 
well. 
 
Figure 5.   Comparison of Times for At Least 10 of 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach 
At Various MTTF When Different Tow Methods are Used (Failure Times are from the 
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t is happening.  In order to enhance the ability to analyze simulation runs and the 
effects of changing various factors, the model has two other types of output.  The first, 
shown in Figures 6 through 10, is the distribution of the numbers of working AAAVs  
(observed over the 200 replications) that reach a given destination (i.e. the beach or the 
LOD) initially.  For instance, if there are two failures in the water phase of the 
amphibious assault and AAAVs are used as the towing asset, then the initial number to 
reach the beach would be 8 AAAVs.  If LCUs are used as the towing asset, the initial 
number would be 10.  Between the time the platoon leaves the beach waypoint and before 
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it reaches the LOD waypoint, if there are, again, 2 failures, but the two failures from the 
first leg were not yet repaired, then the initial number to reach the LOD would be 8 
(given the fact that if AAAVs are the towing asset, the towing AAAVs have rejoined the 
platoon).  This described scenario also assumes that the number of AAAVs that must be 
available at the beach before the platoon moves forward to the LOD is 10.  Figure 6 
shows comparisons of the effects of different distributions of failure times on the initial 
numbers of AAAVs able to reach the beach when AAAVs are used as the towing asset.  
Figure 7 shows the effects of varying the towing assets on the initial number of AAAVs 
able to reach the beach (when failure times are from the Mixed Exponential distribution).  
Figure 8 shows the comparison of the effects of different distributions of failure times on 
the initial numbers of AAAVs able to reach the LOD, and Figure 9 shows, the same 
comparison as Figure 8 on the initial numbers of AAAVs able to reach the Attack 
Objective (AO).  Figures 6-8 all require that there are 10 AAAVs operationally available 
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Figure 6.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the Beach When the Form of the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (With 
MTTF = 6 hrs and AAAVs Used as Towing Asset).  Parameters for the Mixed 
Exponential Distribution are:  p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5. 
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Mixed Exponential MTTF = 6 
 (AAAVs Tow)
size of platoon at destination
 













Mixed Exponential MTTF = 6 
 (LCUs Tow)
size of platoon at destination
 
Figure 7.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the Beach When the Towing Method is Varied (With Failure Times From the 

















Exponential MTTF = 9
size of platoon at destination
 













Mixed Exponential MTTF = 9
size of platoon at destination
 
Figure 8.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the LOD When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (AAAVs were used 

















Exponential MTTF = 18
size of platoon at destination
 













Mixed Exponential MTTF = 18
size of platoon at destination
 
Figure 9.   Comparison of Distributions of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon 
Reaching the AO When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (AAAVs were used 
as the towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential Distribution are: p=0.5; 
λ1=1/6, λ2=1/30 
 
 It is clear from the above histograms (especially the ones with small MTTF) that 
the presence of infant failure times (modeled in the cases where the distribution of failure 
times are from a Mixed Exponential distribution) has a visible adverse effect on the size 
of the platoon upon arrival at various locations.  This is also true in the comparison of 
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tow assets used.  As would be expected, using LCUs to tow quiescent AAAVs causes the 
distribution of the size of the platoon when it first reaches the beach to be much less 
spread out.   
Note:  The model has been tested extensively at all the levels of each factor 
setting.  In the cases listed above (where failure times and distributions are equal) the 
model has been found to be within an acceptable margin of error when compared to 
analytical model results.  The analytical models used for comparison are the subject of an 
NPS Technical Report by Distinguished Professor Donald Gaver et al (2001).  However, 
in one extreme case, where failure times are from the Mixed Exponential distribution 
with MTTF = 3 (p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/5), the simulation model exhibits seemingly 
anomalous behavior.  Specifically, in 3 cases out of 200 replications, the model 
represents the initial size of the platoon upon reaching the beach as a negative number 
(see Figure 10).  This result is merely due to the method of accounting for AAAVs that 
the model uses, and does not invalidate the primary MOE, the time to get 10 of the 12 
AAAVs to the beach in an operational state, or TTB.  The purpose of this model, as 
stated before, is to aid operational testers by suggesting sensitive aspects of operating a 
platoon of AAAVs.  It is not reasonable to assume that, during operational testing, the 
AAAV will still be experiencing an observed MTTF of only three hours.  The extremely 
low mean times to failure used in this section are only shown as a demonstration of how 
sensitive the MOEs are to changes in this factor (MTTF). 
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Mixed Exponential MTTF = 3 
 (AAAVs Towing)
size of platoon at destination
 
 Figure 10.  Distribution of the Initial Size of the Platoon Upon Reaching the Beach 
(extreme case where 3 observations are negative).  Distribution Parameters are:  p=0.5; 
λ1=1, λ2=1/5. 
 
The second analysis enhancement this simulation model provides for examining 
the Times to Beach and Times to the LOD, beyond the standard statistics, is the 
capability to show the distribution of times for the platoon to assemble a given number of 
working AAAVs in the platoon at a given location.  For each replication of the model, the 
simulation records the time to collect (in the case of these initial model runs) 10 of the 12 
AAAVs at the Beach and then at the LOD.  The AAAVs do not proceed from the beach 
to the LOD until 10 available AAAVs assemble at the beach. Just as with the plots of the 
distributions of the initial number of AAAVs to reach given destinations, these plots 
vividly illustrate the tradeoffs between different MTTF, failure distributions, and tow 
methods (in the case of the time to the beach (TTB)).  Figure 11 shows comparisons of 
the effects of different distributions of failure times on the times it takes for 10 of the 12 
AAAVs to reach the beach and be in working order.    Figure 12 shows the effects of 
varying the towing assets on the times to reach the beach (when failure times are from the 
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Mixed Exponential distribution).  Figure 13 shows the comparison of the affects of 
different distributions on the time for 10 of 12 AAAVs to reach the LOD. 











Exponential MTTF = 6
Mean Time To Beach = 4.22 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 











Mixed Exponential MTTF = 6
Mean Time To Beach = 8.29 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 
Figure 11.   Comparison of Distributions of the Times to the Beach for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (MTTF = 6 and AAAVs used 
as towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential Distribution are: p=0.5; λ1=1, 
λ2=1/11.  Minimum time to reach beach without failure is one hour. 
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Mixed Exponential MTTF = 6 
 (AAAVs Towing)
Mean Time To Beach = 8.29 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 











Mixed Exponential MTTF = 6 
 (LCUs Towing)
Mean Time To Beach = 6.82 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 
Figure 12.   Comparison of Distributions of the Times to the Beach for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Tow Method is Varied (Distribution is Mixed Exponential with MTTF 
= 6).  Distribution Parameters are: p=0.5; λ1=1, λ2=1/11.  Minimum time to reach beach 















Exponential MTTF = 9
Mean Time To LOD = 4.82 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 











Mixed Exponential MTTF = 9
Mean Time To LOD = 10.35 hrs
times to reach destination for 10 of 12 AAAVs
 
Figure 13.   Comparison of the Distribution of the Times to the LOD for 10 of 12 
AAAVs When the Distribution of Failure Times is Varied (MTTF = 9 and AAAVs are 
used as towing asset).  Parameters for the Mixed Exponential Distribution are:  p=0.5; 
λ1=1, λ2=1/17.  Minimum time to reach beach without failure is one hour.   
 
In addition to the MOEs TTB and TTS, other MOEs were observed during these 
initial runs.  The other primary MOE, Am or the time-average number of AAAVs in the 
platoon that are operational during the time the platoon is operating in the designated 
objective area, is shown below in table 5 along with other, secondary MOEs.  These 
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secondary MOEs include the Down Time Per AAAV, the Number of Available Helos per 
simulation, and the Flight Time Per Helo.  These MOEs are observed over the same mean 
Failure Times and Distributions as TTB and TTS were in Tables 3 and 4.  The statistics 
Down Time per AAAV, Number of Available Helos and Average Flight Hours per Helo 
are not very important for these initial model runs.  The number of helos has been set to 
an arbitrarily large number so there should not be any shortage of helos, and, with such a 
large number of helos available to divide up the flight time, the total number of flight 
hours recorded during a simulation will be arbitrarily low.  The Down Time per AAAV is 
also not very interesting for these initial runs because there is hardly any variability in the 
model (i.e. none of the times, other than failure times, are random).  Add to that the fact 
that, with unlimited helos and LCUs, the Down Time for each observation is basically 
just the time for a helo to fly to the AAAV (or the time to tow the AAAV to shore or 
ship) plus the time to repair (which is a constant 2 hours for the initial simulation runs), 
which makes this statistic roughly predictable.  However, these statistics become a much 
more valuable analysis tool when many more complications and random time generations 
are added to the model.  Table 5’s results are with model runs using AAAVs as the 
towing assets for quiescent AAAVs in the water.  
 The down time per AAAV and the number of flight hours per helo statistics are 
similarly measured.  For down time, when an AAAV fails, the time of failure is recorded.  
Then when repairs have been completed, the time of repair is recorded.  Subtracting the 
time of failure from the time of repair yields a single down time observation.  The 
average down time per AAAV then, is simply the mean of all the observations of the type 
described above for one replication of the simulation.  Similarly, for flight time per helo, 
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when a helo departs, its departure time is recorded, then when it lands back at the ship, its 
return time is recorded.  Subtracting departure time from return time yields one flight 
time observation.  The individual helos record each flight similarly and add the times of 
all flights together to get a total flight time observation.  At the end of each replication of 
the simulation, each helo records its total flight time observation (this is done at the end 
so as not to count flight time from helos that are destroyed).  The average flight time per 
helo is the mean of all the observations for one replication.   
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Table 5.   All other MOEs for the initial model runs.  AAAVs used as towing asset. 
Standard error term is listed below the mean in parenthesis. 
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Finally, as an enhancement to the primary MOE Am, the model is also capable of 
displaying, at a specified time-step interval, the Ap(t) while the platoon is operating in the 
objective area.  Each time-step interval is the average of (in the case of the initial model 
runs) 200 observations at that exact time.  Figures 14 and 15 show the Ap(t) at a time step 
of every 6 minutes starting at the time the platoon departs the LOD.  The Objective Area 
is 25 miles long from the LOD to the Attack Objective (AO).  At the AO the platoon 
pauses for 8 hours (in simulation of an attack).  The vehicles in the platoon are subject to 
failure during the pause at the AO.  Figure 14 shows the effects on Ap(t) from different 
failure distributions (Exponential and Mixed Exponential) with a MTTF = 6.  Figure 15 
also shows the effects on Ap(t) from different failure distributions (same distributions as 













































































































Figure 14.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 6 hours).  Data is shown 




  Figure 15.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area (MTTF = 18 hours).  Data is 
 














































































































shown without confidence interval bounds. 
 this case, at a time some hours after the initial launch, the form of the assumed 
distribution of failure times does not matter as much as it does early on in the simulation.  
Looking at the two figures together, it appears that as the MTTF increases, an assumed 
Exponential distribution of failure times has a slightly higher Am however, as in Figure 
14, many of the confidence interval bounds overlap, which would mean that there is no 
difference in Am between the two distributions.  Another thing to note is that, in both 
Figures 14 and 15, between the time the platoon enters the objective area until about the 
four hour mark, there is a dip in the Ap(t).  After that time, the Ap(t) seems to somewhat 
stabilize.  The likely reason for this is that, as the platoon is moving, and individual 
AAAVs fail along the way, they must be repaired, then travel independently back to the 
platoon’s position, which takes time.  Also, in both cases, the platoon enters the objective 
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area with approximately 10 AAAVs, which means that most of the time there are 2 
AAAVs in a downed state that have to travel back to the platoon’s position 
independently.  After some time (about three to four hours) the AAAVs that were failed 
at the time the platoon enter the objective area rejoining the platoon.  These vehicles’ 
failure locations were either at the LOD or at some point before it.  Additionally, the 
AAAVs that fail en route to the AO (located somewhere between the LOD and the AO), 
are repaired and rejoin the platoon within that same time-span.  If failures occur while the 
platoon is at the AO and thus, stationary (in a simulated attack), the AAAVs do not have 
to travel any distance to rejoin the platoon after being repaired.  This explains the general 
state of equilibrium after about the four hour mark.   
The results of Figures 14 and 15 can be compared to an analytical calculation for 
the long-run average time a vehicle is up, *MTTRMTTF +
*
MTTF  (in the case of the data used 
minutes travel time from ship to AO at 120 kts) = 
to produce Figure 14, MTTF = 6 hours and MTTR  = 1.5 hours repair time + 37.5 
)625.05.1(6 ++
6  multiplied by the 
interval of the observed long-run availability from Figure 14.  
 
number of vehicles in the platoon (12) yields 8.86.  This number is within the confidence 
.   SIMULATION RUNS OF A MORE COMPLICATED MODEL 
.  Development of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 





Now that the basic simulation model has been built and limite
 complicated and realistic model can be developed.  This new model attempts to 
simulate, as closely as possible, the environment that a typical platoon of AAAVs would 
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normally be expected to operate in.  First, this requires the modeling of a Marine 
Expeditionary Unit (MEU).  This is done by adjusting many of the settings (as shown in 
Tables 1 and 2 of the first section of this chapter) and adding some additional settings that 
control the properties of the model.   
In the first model, the number of helos was given a large enough value so as to 
make t
t AAAVs in 
the wa
heir supply unlimited.  However, a MEU can only deploy with approximately 16 
helicopters.  Currently the types of (support) helos on a MEU are the CH-46 (12) and the 
CH-54 (4).  Initially 12 of these 16 total helos are required to transport the Air Assault 
Company of the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) to the objective.  The simulation, 
therefore, will allocate 4 helos for logistics purposes (i.e. to provide support for failed 
AAAVs) until the Air Assault Company has been delivered.  Once those 12 helos return 
and are refueled, they are added to the number of available helos for rescue missions.  
Additionally, helos in this model will be subject to attrition on any flight.  Attrition is 
parameterized by a constant probability a helo is destroyed during a flight.   
Also in the first model, the supply of LCU craft for towing quiescen
ter was unlimited.  The typical MEU deploys with one.  Therefore the number of 
simulated LCU craft will also be one.  In the first model the settings only allowed for 
either AAAVs to tow quiescent AAAVs or LCUs to do it, but not both.  However, it is 
realistic to assume that if there is more than one failure in the water, and the only LCU 
available is engaged, then AAAVs would tow the additional failed vehicles.  So, the 
settings in this model allow for either exclusive towing by the AAAVs, or combined 
towing by first the LCU, then the AAAVs.     
63 
As discussed in Chapter III, the situation may or may not allow for placing 
logistics assets ashore for support of the AAAV platoon.  If the MEU commander  
decides to insert a logistics base ashore, however, he cannot do so until the other non-
amphibious assault vehicles (LAAVs and/or Tanks) have been placed ashore.  The only 
means for surface vehicles other than AAAVs to reach the shore is via the Landing Craft 
Air Cushioned (LCAC) vehicle.  A MEU typically deploys with 2 LCACs that, due to 
weight requirements, have considerable limitations in the amount of cargo they can carry.  
In the first wave of the amphibious assault (along with the AAAV platoon) the LCACs 
launch with the battalion landing team’s (BLT) other mechanized assets such as LAAV 
vehicles and Tanks if they are present in the MEU.  Therefore, if a logistics base is to be 
established, it does not get to the shore until at least after the first LCAC wave is 
complete.  If the MEU does have Tanks, the logistics base is probably not be able to be 
inserted ashore until after at least two LCAC trips.  This model simulates one LCAC 
round trip before the logistics base is loaded and then taken to the shore.  The load and 
unload times for the LCACs are implemented as random time draw from a uniform 
distribution, and the travel time is calculated based on the speed of the LCAC and the 
distance from the ship to the beach.  LCACs are not subject to attrition or failure.  The 
simulations will test the model with and without the use of a ground logistics base and 
look for tradeoffs between the two settings.  Table 6 below shows all the general settings 
used for this model. 
General Property Value Comments 
Number AAAVs 12 
AAAV Avg Speed 25 (kts)  
AAAV Avg Tow Speed 5 (kts) 
Number LCUs 1  
LCU Speed 8 (kts) 
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General Property Value Comments 
LCU Tow Speed 4 (kts) 
Number LCACs 2 
LCAC Speed 40 (kts) 
Number LCAC trips needed 
prior to Log Base Delivery 
1 
Total Number of Helos 16  
Number Assault Helos 12 Delivers Air Assault 
Company 
Helo Avg Speed 120 (kts) 
Probability of Helo Attrition 0.05 
Number of AAAVs needed 
to proceed 
Varies from 10 to 12 Platoon stops at Beach 
and/or LOD until this 
number of functioning 
AAAVs is present 
Stop at Beachhead Yes 
Stop at LOD Yes 
Method of towing AAAVs 
used 
AAAV only/LCU and AV 
combined 
Varied so that comparisons 
can be made 
Logistics Base Inserted Yes/No Varied so that comparisons 
can be made 
Number of Trucks at Log 
Base 
10  
Avg Speed of Logistics 
Trucks 
20 (kts) Knots used in order to keep 
all speed units equal 
Probability that Part Needed 
for Repair Will Be at Log 
Base 
0.8 If part is not available, log 
base must call back to ship 
for delivery of part via helo 
Standoff Distance  15 miles Constant distance maintained 
from Log Base location to 
position of AAAV platoon 
Table 6.   General Properties for Advanced Model Runs 
 
2.  Adding More Levels of Reality:  Making All Settings Stochastic and 
Sampling Failure and Repair Times From the Weibull Distribution 
The first model uses the Exponential distribution and the Mixed Exponential 
distribution to demonstrate the effect that the assumed form of the distribution has on the 
MOEs.  Specifically, the Mixed Exponential distribution allows the introduction of infant 
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failure times in the model, which is shown to have drastic effects on the platoon of 
AAAV’s ability to maintain an acceptable level of availability, especially early on in the 
simulation.  But because of its memoryless property, the Exponential distribution is 
limited in its applicability.  A more flexible, but also more mathematically complicated 
distribution, is the Weibull distribution.  The Weibull distribution, specified with a shape 
(κ) parameter and a scale (λ) parameter that implicitly define its mean and variance, is 
itself a generalization of the Exponential distribution.  The Weibull distribution is widely 
considered to be very appropriate and useful for a wide range of applications related to 
system or component failures, as well as for computing times to complete a task, such as 
making repairs. (Leemis 1995)  
The models in this section use the Weibull distribution to simulate the failure 
times for AAAVs as well as the times to repair the AAAVs.  By varying the shape 
parameter (κ) the model can produce different behaviors from the random numbers 
generated by the distribution.  When κ < 1 the distribution generates many small, but 
positive numbers, balanced by some that are very long in order to obtain the required 
mean.  An example of the distribution of failure times generated from a Weibull 
distribution with a shape parameter less than one can be seen on Figure 16.  When κ = 1, 
the Weibull distribution becomes equal to the Exponential distribution with mean λ.  As 
κ becomes greater than one, the distribution of times begins to become centered about the 
value of the scale parameter (λ).  The survivor function (probability a failure time is 
greater than t) of the Weibull distribution used in generating failure and repair times for 
this model is given by the equation, S(t) = . Figure 17 shows the distribution of )( te λ
κ−
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times generated from a Weibull distribution with κ equal to approximately 1.5.  Finally, 
as κ continues to increase to a value between 3 and 4, it resembles that of a normal 
probability density function.  Figure 18 shows an example the distribution of times 
generated from a Weibull distribution with κ equal to approximately 3.5. 














Figure 16.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 0.74 and λ = 30.0. 














Figure 17.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 1.5 and λ = 40.0. 
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Figure 18.   Distribution of Failure Times Generated from a Weibull Distribution with 
MTTF = 36 and Parameter Settings κ = 3.6 and λ = 40.0. 
 
The three general forms of the Weibull distribution as shown in Figures 16-18, 
will be used in this portion of the thesis (using the same approximate shape parameter 
values) to show how varying the form of the distribution  affects the MOEs.  Because a 
shape parameter of less than one yields the highest amount of infant failure behavior, it is 
referred to as the “High Weibull” distribution.  Any time a High Weibull distribution is 
used, the shape parameter is set at approximately 0.75 and the scale parameter is adjusted 
accordingly in order to achieve a specified MTTF.  Following the same methodology, a 
Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of approximately 1.5 is referred to as a 
“Medium Weibull” and a distribution with a shape parameter of approximately 3.5 is 
referred to as a “Low Weibull”.   
The parameters used for the three types of distributions are referred to as 
“approximate” simply because they are not the same for every MTTF.  For each MTTF 
used for the experiments in this section, the three types of Weibull distributions described 
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above were obtained by estimation.  Using the desired shape parameter value along with 
the desired MTTF value and varying the scale parameter accordingly, 1,000,000 random 
numbers from a Weibull distribution are generated using the S-Plus  statistical software 
package.  The parameters that correspond to the mean of the 1,000,000 numbers are  the 
ones used in the subsequent experiments in this section.    
Because repair times, or the mean corrective maintenance time (MCMT) is a 
specific requirement in the ORD that must be tested, it is important to explicitly test to 
see if the form of the distribution of repair times has any effect on the MOEs.   Therefore, 
the distribution of repair times is also be varied using approximately the same shape 
parameter values as is used for generating failure times.  The distributions used to 
calculate a specified MCMT, therefore, will also be referred to as High, Medium and 
Low.   
In the first model, other than the failure times, all the time-delays during the 
simulation are constant, or, in some cases non-existent (such as in the case of helo refuel 
times).  However, in this model all the time-delays of the simulation are stochastic.  In 
other words, all the time delays of the simulation are randomly generated from a 
specified distribution with specified parameters.  All of the time delays, other than the 
failure times and repair times, are obtained by randomly generating values from the 
Uniform distribution.    
The parameters used in the stochastic properties create arbitrarily large ranges of 
possible values.  This is done in an attempt to represent the complete spectrum of 
possible operating conditions.  However, this attempt to represent reality as closely as 
possible may cause a large amount of variability in the model’s MOEs, especially the 
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MOEs that measure the time it takes the platoon to complete a task, such as the time to 
get to the beach (TTB).  Measuring and accounting for this variability will be discussed 
later in this chapter.  Table 7 below shows all the stochastic properties of this model and 
their settings. 
Stochastic Property Distribution Parameters Comments 
Failure Times Weibull [κ,λ] κ ≅ 0.74 “High” 
κ ≅ 1.5 “Medium” 
κ ≅ 3.5 “Low” 
Using the three 
values of κ, and a 
given MTTF, a value 
for λ will be 
determined 
Repair Times Weibull  [κ,λ] with  
MCMT = 1.5 hours 
and 3 hours 
κ ≅ 0.74 “High” 
κ ≅ 2 “Medium” 
κ ≅ 3.5 “Low” 
Same methodology 
as used above 
Prep Times for Helos Uniform [a,b] a= 0.333 hrs 
b = 1.0 hr 
Time b/w rescue 
mission assigned to 
helo and helo 
departure 
Refuel Times for 
Helos 
Uniform [a,b] a= 0.333 hrs 
b = 1.0 hr 
ALDT Uniform [a,b] a= 0.05 hrs 
b = 0.75 hrs 
For AAAV repairs 
made on ship only 
Time to Commence 
Towing 
Uniform [a,b] a= 0.5 hrs 
b = 1.0 hr 
Time from failure to 
start of tow action 
(AAAVs only) 
Pause at Attack 
Objective 
Uniform [a,b] a= 7.0 hrs 
b = 10.0 hrs 
Simulated length of 
"attack" 
Pause for Assault 
Helos at Obj 
Constant 0.5 hours Time to unload Air 
Assault Company at 
Objective 
Pause for LCACs at 
Beach 
Uniform [a,b] a= 1.0 hr 
b = 1.5 hrs 
Time to unload 
LCACs at the 
beachhead 
Pause for LCACs at 
the Ship 
Uniform [a,b] a= 1.5 hrs 
b = 2.0 hrs 
Time to re-load 
LCACs at the ship 
after delivering initial 
cargo at the beach 
Refuel Times for 
Trucks 
Uniform [a,b] a= 0.2 hrs 
b = 1.0 hrs 
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Stochastic Property Distribution Parameters Comments 
Prep Times for 
Trucks 
Uniform [a,b] a= 0.25 hrs 
b = 0.75 hrs 
Time b/w rescue 
mission assigned to 
truck and truck 
departure 
Table 7.   Stochastic Properties for Advanced Model Runs 
 
3.  Method of Analysis of the Advanced Model 
The primary (although not exclusive) focus of the simplistic model is on 
analyzing the effects of varying the MTTF and the form of the distribution of failure 
times on the MOEs.  For the more advance model, however, partly because the case for 
the importance of the failure times and their assumed distributions has already been 
made, and because so much variability and reality has been added to the model, 
analyzing the effects of multiple variables is now the focus.   
In order to study the effects of these multiple variables or factors on the MOEs or 
response variables, a series of screening experiments is conducted.  The intent is to 
simultaneously study the effects of multiple factors, thus determining which are 
important and might warrant further study, and which can be discarded as either 
statistically, or practically insignificant.  This is done by conducting factorial design 
experiments on multiple input factors that measure their effects on the MOEs   This type 
of design requires relatively few runs per factor studied and is probably the most efficient 
method of analyzing several model factors.  The levels of each factor are tested at ranges 
that attempt to represent the complete spectrum of possible operational conditions.   
Note:  A full factorial design is one that has all levels of a given factor combined 
with all the levels of each other factor in the experiment.  Although none of the factorial 
design experiments have replications, each “run” (simulation with specific factor level 
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settings) of the experiment is actually the average of 200 replications of that particular 
run.  This should produce test observations (means of each of the 200 replications) that 
are normally distributed due to the Central Limit Theorem, which should, in turn result in 
normally distributed sets of residual standard error terms.  The Central Limit Theorem 
states that even when the population distribution is non-normal (as they most-certainly 
are in this case), when the populations are averaged, the distribution of the collection of 
population means is normally distributed. (Devore 1995)  However, the variances of the 
population averages may not be the same.  In particular it is reasonable to expect that as 
the value of the response (in the case of the mean time to reach a destination) increases, 
so does the variance of the response. 
Because these factorial design experiments involve the comparison of multiple 
population means based on sample statistics from the simulations, one of the techniques 
used for analysis in this section is Analysis of Variance (ANOVA).  ANOVA works by 
partitioning the variance of the dependent variable from an experiment into parts to test 
whether or not the factors that were introduced into the design actually affect its value.  
The efficiency of ANOVA is derived by utilizing all the observations across all 
combinations of test factors to estimate the experimental error or random error inherent 
in the process.  ANOVA uses the F-test to compare the estimated variability attributable 
to a test factor to the estimated error and, subsequently, tests for a significant effect.  
However, the F-test is based on the model that requires that the variances of the 
population means for all the factors be equal.  Even though this assumption may be 
violated, ANOVA is still used for partial and preliminary data exploration.  The 
justification for doing so is that even with some assumptions violated, ANOVA can still 
72 
be used as a crude, but initial tool to show which variables are very important, or not very 
important, or which ones lie somewhere in between.  Variables for which ANOVA tests 
show are not very important can be discarded and those that are deemed otherwise can be 
tested using other analysis methods. 
Each experiment has designated, primary factors, that are explicitly tested, 
however, as mentioned above, there will be multiple, uncontrolled and randomly 
generated stochastic time-delays present in every run of the simulation.  Because each 
“observation” of the factorial experiments will actually be the average of 200 runs of the 
simulation with the same factor levels, this could hide the fact that there is a large amount 
of variability between runs.  Actually, this behavior should be expected since the model 
does have so much inherent variability.   
Just using the population (factor level) means to describe the effects that 
important factors and their possible levels may have on measured MOEs is, on its own, 
also too crude of a measurement.  Because of this, the variability between runs of a 
simulation with the same factor level settings is explicitly measured.  To further highlight 
the between-run variability, some populations of runs with selected factor level settings 
are analyzed in-depth using techniques introduced in the first section of this chapter.    
4.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Time To Beach (TTB) 
An experiment is conducted to measure the time for the entire AAAV platoon (12 
AAAVs) to reach the beach from a ship 25 nm offshore.  Four primary factors are tested 
for their effects on the response variable (TTB):  mean failure times, failure time 
distribution, repair time distribution, and tow method.  The first three factors each have 
three levels, and the last factor has two levels.  A full factorial design is used requiring 54 
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runs of the model in order to compare each factor level against every other factor level.  




Factor       Type  Levels  Values  
Repair Distn   fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)   
Fail Dis    fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)  
MTTF (hours)   fixed      3   18 36 72 
Tow Method    fixed      2   AV  AV/LCU 
 
Analysis of Variance for Time To Beach (TTB) using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Repair Distn         2      0.304      0.304      0.152    6.48  0.005 
Fail Distn           2    213.874    213.874    106.937 4567.45  0.000 
MTTF                 2     32.850     32.850     16.425  701.54  0.000 
Tow Method           1      0.158      0.158      0.158    6.76  0.015 
Repair D*Fail Dis    4      0.546      0.546      0.137    5.83  0.002 
Repair D*MTTF        4      0.123      0.123      0.031    1.31  0.289 
Repair D*Tow Meth    2      0.009      0.009      0.004    0.19  0.832 
Fail Dis*MTTF        4     43.813     43.813     10.953  467.83  0.000 
Fail Dis*Tow Meth    2      0.215      0.215      0.107    4.58  0.019 
MTTF*Tow Meth        2      0.054      0.054      0.027    1.16  0.328 
Error               28      0.656      0.656      0.023 
Total               53    292.602   
 
Figure 19.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs To 


















Figure 20.   Normal Probability Plot of Residuals Where the Response Variable is the 
Time for 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach (TTB). 































Figure 21.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are the Times for 12 AAAVs to 

























Figure 22.   Plot of the Interaction Between the Factors MTTF and Failure Distribution 
Where the Response Variable is the Times for 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach (TTB). 
 
Figure 20 shows a standard normal plot of the residual terms.  Since the plot is 
roughly linear, the residual terms appear to be roughly summarized by a normal 
distribution.  The assumption that the observations have normal distributions with the 
same variance is required in order to use the F-test to determine significance.  However, 
as stated, even if the variances are not equal, the F test can be used for exploratory data 
analysis. 
From the Analysis of Variance in Figure 19, it is overwhelmingly clear that the 
factors that most strongly affect the mean time for the platoon to reach the beach are the 
MTTF and the form of the assumed distribution of failure times.  Out of a total sum of 
squares value of 292.602, the failure distribution’s sum of squares value is 213.874, or 
72.4% of the model’s variability.  Second in terms of the model’s sources of variability, 
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is the first-order interaction between the Failure Distribution and the MTTF.  Figure 22 
above illustrates why this is the cause of 15% of the model’s variability.  Regardless of 
the MTTF (even at its lowest level = 18 hours), if the distribution of failure times is from 
a Weibull distribution with a shape parameter of approximately 3.5, failures never occur 
during the water-transit stage of the simulation, thus leading to a mean TTB of 1 hour 
with zero variability between runs (see Figure 23 below).  One hour is the minimum time 
to reach the beach.  If the distribution of failure times is Weibull with a shape parameter 
of approximately 1.5, it still has no effect on the mean TTB if the level of the MTTF 
factor is 72 hours.  For MTTF factor levels 36 and 18, however, a shape parameter of 1.5 
causes a slight increase in the mean TTB, although the mean value of the TTB is still 
under 2 hours for both levels.  The average between-run variability of all simulations 
with a shape parameter approximately equal to 1.5 (measured in standard deviations) is 
1.36 hours.  But when the failure distribution shape parameter is approximately equal to 
0.74, the mean TTB is drastically affected.  In addition, the between-run variability of the 
model, when the failure distribution factor is at this level, is very large.  The average 
between-run variability at this level (in standard deviations) is 5.44 hours.  In contrast to 
Figure 23, Figures 24 and 25 show how a typical simulation, with the failure distribution 
having a shape parameter approximately equal to 0.74, creates a large distribution of 
times to the beach for the platoon. 
Finally from the ANOVA table in Figure 19, the third largest source of variability 
in the model is from the MTTF, which contributes 11.2%.  These three terms together 
combine for 98.5% of the model’s variability.  Even with the wide range of variability, in 
most cases, given to the other factors, their effect on the mean time to reach the beach for 
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the model is extremely minimal.  The error term from the ANOVA table, which shows 
the model’s unexplained source of variance is only 0.2%.  Again, this says nothing about 
the variability of the model between runs when factor levels are constant. 











Mean Time To Beach = 1.0 hrs
Times to Reach Destination for Entire Platoon
 
Figure 23.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
Times are from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 3.55 and λ = 20) with MTTF = 18 hours. 











Mean Time To Beach = 5.04 hrs
Times to Reach Destination for Entire Platoon
 
Figure 24.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
















Mean Time To Beach = 3.1 hrs
Times to Reach Destination for Entire Platoon
 
Figure 25.   Distribution of Times For 12 AAAVs to Reach the Beach When Failure 
Times are from a Weibull Distribution (κ = 0.74 and λ = 60) with MTTF = 72 hours. 
 
The histograms above in Figures 23-25 show that a mean time to get to the beach 
calculation is not always a good summary of the data on its own.  Although mean time 
calculations are influenced by outliers, the between-run variability must be looked at in 
order to gain a full appreciation of the possible range of values, such as in the case of 
Figures 24 and 25. 
Because it is shown that the variances of this model are somewhat dependent on 
the response (mean time to the beach), a further analysis of the ANOVA model is 
conducted.  Once again, the assumption is that, because a large number of observations 
are used to form the population (factor level) means, the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) 
ensures that the distribution of means can be summarized by a normal distribution. This 
assumption is verified by a normal plot of the residuals that seems roughly linear.   
However, as seen from the observations of individual runs, as well as the means of 
multiple runs, the variance increases as the mean time to reach the beach increases.  This 
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type of behavior can mean that there is a condition in the data known as 
heteroscedasticity.  This is usually characterized by residuals, in a residuals versus fitted 
Y-value plot, that exhibit increasing or decreasing scatter versus a fitted response 
variable.  Another noticeable feature of the data being analyzed, particularly in the case 
of the MOEs mean TTB and mean TTS, is that the individual time observations tend to 
be heavily concentrated at the far left of the x-axis, with long, thin tails to the right.  This, 
despite the large sample CLT effects, might mean that errors are not normally distributed.  
The presence of heteroscedasticity or nonnormal errors, as is conceded earlier, could 
undermine the rationale for the F-test and, in-turn, cast doubt on the validity of the 
observed P-values. 
To explicitly test for heteroscedasticity and non-nomality, a plot of the residuals 
versus the fitted Y-values (responses) is made.  If heteroscedasticity exists, then a horn or 
funnel shape in the data should be noticed as the size of the residuals tend to increase as 
the size of the observations increase.  Figure 26 below does, in-fact, show that some 
heteroscedasticity exists, and that there is a pattern of increasing residual values as the 





















Figure 26.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 
Mean TTS.  Plot shows some heteroscedasticity exists. 
 
To try and alleviate this problem, the log of each population mean observation is 
taken.  Taking logs tends to make the means and variances of the times less associated.  
This transformation technique is widely used to when problems of nonnormality and 
heteroscedasticity exist in data.  After the data is transformed, another ANOVA model is 

















Figure 27.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 





Factor       Type  Levels  Values  
Repair Distn   fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)   
Fail Dis    fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)  
MTTF (hours)   fixed      3   18 36 72 
Tow Method    fixed      2   AV  AV/LCU 
 
Analysis of Variance for log(mean TTB)  
 
Source               DF         SS         MS       F      P 
Repair D              2    0.00278    0.00139    7.96  0.002 
Fail Dis              2    5.06538    2.53269 1.4E+04  0.000 
MTTF                  2    0.40735    0.20367 1164.41  0.000 
Tow Meth              1    0.00245    0.00245   14.00  0.001 
Repair D*Fail Dis     4    0.00422    0.00105    6.03  0.001 
Repair D*MTTF         4    0.00102    0.00025    1.45  0.243 
Repair D*Tow Meth     2    0.00006    0.00003    0.16  0.853 
Fail Dis*MTTF         4    0.25516    0.06379  364.69  0.000 
Fail Dis*Tow Meth     2    0.00182    0.00091    5.21  0.012 
MTTF*Tow Meth         2    0.00039    0.00020    1.12  0.342 
Error                28    0.00490    0.00017 
Total                53    5.74552  
Figure 28.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable is log of Mean Time for 
12 AAAVs To Reach the Beach (TTB). 
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Figure 27 above, shows that the heteroscedasticity that exited in the non-
transformed data, seems to have been eliminated by taking the log of each of the 
population means, although there is the presence of one rather large outlier.  Now the 
assumption of equal variance is more valid, which should, in-turn remove some of the 
doubt about the validity of the F-test.  Comparing Figure 28, the analysis of variance of 
the transformed data, to Figure 19, the ANOVA with the normal, non-transformed data 
shows that the F-statistics and P-values do not noticeably change.  The factors and first-
order interactions that are significant and important when a key assumption is violated, 
are still significant after the data is transformed, and the assumptions are met.  This is not 
the only data-transformation technique however, therefore others will be tested on later 
models to see if they have an effect on F-statistics and P-values. 
Although many of the factors and interaction terms are statistically significant 
(i.e. p-values of less that .05) only the two factors and the interaction between them 
(discussed above and highlighted in bold print in Figure 19) are practically significant.  
Figure 21 examined in conjunction with Figure 19 illustrates this well.  For instance, the 
form of the distribution of repair times is found to be statistically significant at a level of 
99.5% in Figure 19, however, Figure 21 shows that its real affect on the mean TTB can 
be measured in a small amount of minutes and thus is practically insignificant.   This fact 
goes back to the earlier discussion about the reasons for using the ANOVA model.  In 
some cases (here it overvalues the repair time distribution factor) it is too crude a tool to 
be used alone. 
Finally, Figure 29 below is another good example why significance testing is 
good, but can be misleading if viewed independently of any other type of statistic.  
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Although all the primary factors, and two first-order interactions are found to be 
statistically significant, Figure 29 clearly shows that there is no real difference in the 
mean time to reach the beach between any of the levels for the tow method or repair 
distribution factors.  This fact can easily be extended to the first-order interactions 
involving ether of these factors.  This is due to the fact that the confidence intervals of the 
different levels of the tow asset and repair dstribution factors overlap.  The confidence 
intervals of the mean time to reach the beach for the factors MTTF and Failure 
Distribution do not overlap, however, so the same cannot be said about them.  The 
inconsequential effect that varying the tow method has on the mean TTB response 
variable should not be surprising.  One auxiliary vehicle compared to none is not much of 
a change in factor levels.  However, the benefit of several auxiliary vehicles is clearly 
shown with the simpler model in the first section of this chapter.  
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       Individual 95% CI 
Fail Distn      Mean   -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
Wei(low)        1.00    (--*--) 
Wei(med)        1.36      (--*--) 
Wei(hi)         5.39                                 (--*--) 
                       -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                           1.50      3.00      4.50      6.00 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
MTTF            Mean   --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
18              3.63                              (------*-----) 
36              2.36            (------*-----) 
72              1.75   (------*------) 
                       --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
                      1.40      2.10      2.80      3.50 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Tow Method      Mean   ---------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
AV              2.53    (------------------*-----------------) 
AV/LCU          2.64      (------------------*-----------------) 
                       ---------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                             2.00      2.50      3.00      3.50 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Repair Distn    Mean   -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
low             2.53   (------------------*------------------) 
med             2.53   (------------------*------------------) 
hi              2.69      (------------------*------------------) 
                       -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                           1.80      2.40      3.00      3.60 
Figure 29.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 
Response Variable is mean TTB. 
 
5.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Time To LOD (TTS) 
An experiment is conducted to measure the time for the entire AAAV platoon (12 
AAAVs) to reach the Line of Departure (LOD) which is 25 nm from the beachhead.  This 
experiment is run simultaneously with the previous experiment; that is, after the platoon 
waits at the beach for all 12 AAAVs to arrive and become operational (and have their 
time to do so measured) they proceed onto the LOD and undergo the same procedure 
there.   As a consequence, the platoon always leaves the beach with 12 working AAAVs.  
An additional consequence to this is that long times to get 12 AAAVs to the Beach (TTB) 
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have a direct effect on this response variable because the time to the LOD includes the 
TTB.   The same four primary factors as before are tested for their effects on the response 
variable (TTS):  mean failure times, failure time distribution, repair time distribution, and 
tow method.  The first three factors each have three levels, and the last factor has two 
levels.  A full factorial design is used requiring 54 runs of the model in order to compare 
each factor level against every other factor level.  Each run consists of 200 replications.  
Figure 30 below shows the results of this experiment. 
The results of this experiment show that, once again the form of the distribution 
of failure times, the MTTF and their interaction effect combine to create more than 99% 
of the model’s variability.  This is essentially the same result as in the previous 
experiment, and therefore is not discussed further. 
 
 
Factor       Type  Levels  Values  
Repair Distn   fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)  
Fail Distn    fixed      3   Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)  
MTTF (hrs)     fixed      3   18 36 72 
Tow Method    fixed      2   AV AV/LCU 
 
Analysis of Variance for Time To LOD, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Repair D             2      0.363      0.363      0.181    5.71  0.008 
Fail Dis             2    478.621    478.621    239.311 7539.18  0.000 
MTTF                 2     94.082     94.082     47.041 1481.96  0.000 
Tow Meth             1      0.064      0.064      0.064    2.02  0.167 
Repair D*Fail Dis    4      0.780      0.780      0.195    6.15  0.001 
Repair D*MTTF        4      0.115      0.115      0.029    0.90  0.475 
Repair D*Tow Meth    2      0.050      0.050      0.025    0.79  0.466 
Fail Dis*MTTF        4    112.204    112.204     28.051  883.71  0.000 
Fail Dis*Tow Meth    2      0.080      0.080      0.040    1.26  0.300 
MTTF*Tow Meth        2      0.013      0.013      0.007    0.21  0.815 
Error               28      0.889      0.889      0.032 
Total               53    687.260   
 
Figure 30.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs To 
Reach the LOD, or Time to Step-Off (TTS). 
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6.  Analysis of Factor Effects on MOE Mission Availability (Am) 
An experiment is conducted to measure the average number of AAAVs available 
in an operational condition during the time the platoon is in the designated objective area, 
otherwise known as mission availability (Am).  Five primary factors are tested for their 
effects on the response variable Am:  failure times, failure distribution form, repair 
distribution form, operational distance, and logistics support method.  As before, the 
factors failure distribution form, and repair distribution form have three levels, high 
medium and low.  This experiment, however, only looks at two levels for the MTTF, 36 
and 72 hours.  MTTF = 18 hours is not examined because this is an unrealistic value, 
especially for what should be expected during operational testing.   Two levels for the 
distance factor are used, 50 and 100 nm.  These distances include the total length of travel 
from the ship to the final objective.  Finally the logistics support method is varied 
between inserting a ground logistics base with trucks, and conducting all logistics support 
from the ship via helos.  However, even when the simulation uses a ground logistics base, 
it is only inserted after the LCACs have made one round trip with their original cargo.  
That is, the log base appears after the LCACs travel to the beach, draw a randomly 
generated unload time, travel back to the ship, draw a randomly generated load time (load 
time parameters are larger than unload parameters), travel back to the beach, and finally 
draw a randomly generated unload time.  A full factorial design is used requiring 72 runs 
of the model in order to compare each factor level against every other factor level.  Each 




Factor       Type  Levels Values  
Repair Distn    fixed      3  Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi) 
Fail Distn    fixed      3  Wei(low) Wei(med) Wei(hi)  
MTTF (hours)   fixed      2  36 72 
Distance (miles) fixed      2  50 100 
Log Base    fixed      2  Yes No  
 
Analysis of Variance for Availabi, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Repair D             2  0.0000107  0.0000107  0.0000053    0.62  0.544 
Fail Distn           2  0.1304645  0.1304645  0.0652322 7531.13  0.000 
MTTF                 1  0.0090429  0.0090429  0.0090429 1044.02  0.000 
Distance             1  0.0025924  0.0025924  0.0025924  299.29  0.000 
Log Base             1  0.0008785  0.0008785  0.0008785  101.42  0.000 
Repair D*Fail Dis    4  0.0000078  0.0000078  0.0000020    0.23  0.922 
Repair D*MTTF        2  0.0000055  0.0000055  0.0000028    0.32  0.728 
Repair D*Distance    2  0.0000041  0.0000041  0.0000021    0.24  0.788 
Repair D*Log Base    2  0.0000105  0.0000105  0.0000053    0.61  0.549 
Fail Dis*MTTF        2  0.0040778  0.0040778  0.0020389  235.39  0.000 
Fail Dis*Distance    2  0.0013839  0.0013839  0.0006919   79.88  0.000 
Fail Dis*Log Base    2  0.0010354  0.0010354  0.0005177   59.77  0.000 
MTTF*Distance        1  0.0001269  0.0001269  0.0001269   14.65  0.000 
MTTF*Log Base        1  0.0001186  0.0001186  0.0001186   13.69  0.001 
Distance*Log Base    1  0.0000823  0.0000823  0.0000823    9.50  0.004 
Error               45  0.0003898  0.0003898  0.0000087 
Total               71  0.1502316   
 
Figure 31.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Am. 
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Figure 32.   Normal Probability Plot of Residuals Where the Response Variable is Am. 
 

















































Figure 34.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are for the Time Average Number of 
AAAVs in the Platoon That are Operational During the Time the Platoon is in the 
Objective Area. 
 
The normal plot of the residual standard error terms in Figure 32 suggests that the 
residuals are roughly summarized by a normal distribution.  Figure 33, the residuals 
versus the fitted Y-values plot, shows that, except for the presence of three outliers, the 
data seems to be generally patternless and thus, homoscedastistic.  These two figures 
together show that for this response variable, all the necessary assumptions for using 
ANOVA seem to be met even without a data-transformation.  The Analysis of Variance 
in Figure 31 shows that, again, the primary factor causing variability in the model is the 
form of the distribution of failure times.  This factor has a sum of squares value of 0.1304 
or 86.8% of the model’s variability.  This is not a surprise, since all the models prior to 
this have also had similar results.  The factor MTTF, however, only accounts for 6% of 
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this model’s variability. Other than that, there are many other factors and interaction 
terms that account for approximately 1% or less of overall model variability.   
Figure 34 is perhaps the most revealing illustration of this model’s results.  While 
the ANOVA table in Figure 31 again shows that many of the factors and interactions are 
statistically significant, none of the factors except for the failure distribution form (and 
then only marginally) are at all practically significant.  Of these results, one of the most 
surprising is the fact that varying the operational distance of the platoon by 50 miles only 
accounts for a change in the mean Am of 0.002 or 0.2%.  In other words this is a change 
in the mean of the time average number of available AAAVs (out of 12) from 11.436 to 
11.412.  This is hardly a substantial difference.  Figure 34 (above) along with Figure 35 
(below) show similar results for all the factors tested.   
But perhaps the lack of practical significance for most of the factors is not so 
surprising after-all.  For example, the distance factor is varied by 50 miles, but if there is 
a logistics base inserted, this does not matter, since the trucks maintain a constant 
standoff distance from the platoon.  In the case where there is no logistics base, the helos 
travel at a speed of 120 kts.  At that rate of speed, the difference between the distance 
factor levels, 50 miles, is only 25 minutes.  Additionally, with a standoff distance of 15 
miles, trucks in the logistics base (with a speed of 20 kts) have a travel time of 45 
minutes, while helos, even from 100 miles away, have a travel time of only just under 50 
minutes.     
The between-run variability of all factor levels was also very low and thus not 
very significant.  An example of this can be found in figure 36 (below).  This figure 
shows the time-step measured Ap(t) while the platoon is in the objective area.  The 
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measurements are taken with the factor level for the failure distribution set with a shape 
parameter of 0.74 and the factor level for MTTF set at 36 hours.  Each point and 
subsequent confidence band are the summary of 200 observations at that exact time-
period. 
Once again, the results of the observed long-run availability (from Figure 36) can 
be compared to an analytical calculation for the long-run average time a vehicle is up, 
*MTTRMTTF
MTTF
+  (where MTTR




+++  = 0.93 multiplied by the number of vehicles in the platoon 
(12) yields 11.16.  This is clearly not the same as the observed long-run availability as 
seen in Figure 36.  The model (at the factor levels used to produce Figure 36) seems to 
reach a steady state of slightly less than 10 vehicles.  As is the case in the first section of 
this chapter, the analytical calculation for the long-run availability is more optimistic than 
the values observed here.  The comparison against this section’s model is not as good as 
it is against the simper model, however.  This is understandable since there are many 




                       Individual 95% CI 
Fail Distn      Mean   ---+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
Wei(low)      0.9983                                     (-*) 
Wei(med)      0.9742                             (-*) 
Wei(hi)       0.8984    (*-) 
                       ---+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                     0.9000    0.9300    0.9600    0.9900 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
MTTF            Mean   ----+---------+---------+---------+------- 
36            0.9457    (----*----) 
72            0.9682                                (----*----) 
                       ----+---------+---------+---------+------- 
                      0.9440    0.9520    0.9600    0.9680 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Distance        Mean   -+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
 50           0.9630              (-----------*------------) 
100           0.9510    (-----------*------------) 
                       -+---------+---------+---------+---------+ 
                   0.9360    0.9480    0.9600    0.9720    0.9840 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Log Base        Mean   --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
Yes           0.9535   (--------------*---------------) 
No            0.9604          (--------------*---------------) 
                       --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
                    0.9400    0.9500    0.9600    0.9700 
   
   Individual 95% CI 
Repair Distn    Mean   ---+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
low           0.9564   (------------------*------------------) 
med           0.9570    (------------------*------------------) 
hi            0.9574    (------------------*------------------) 
                       ---+---------+---------+---------+-------- 
                     0.9400    0.9500    0.9600    0.9700 
Figure 35.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 


































































































Figure 36.   Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the 
Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective Area.   Failure Times are from a 
Weibull Distribution (κ = 0.74 and λ = 30) with MTTF = 36 hours.  The Total 
Operational Distance From Ship to Attack Objective (AO) is 100 nm. 
 
7.  Further Analysis of Different Factor’s Effects on MOE Time to LOD 
(TTS). 
In all three models tested above, with settings at levels that attempt to reflect the 
true assets of a MEU, the failure distribution form and the MTTF are the only two 
practically significant factors when measuring factor effects on population means.   This 
is a result that should not be glossed over.  It is undeniable proof that merely calculating a 
MTTF during testing and assuming that the failures are exponentially distributed is not 
adequate.  A MTTF could represent many short times to failure coupled with some very 
long times to create a distribution of failure times like some of those simulated in this 
thesis.   
However, many of the more complicated simulation model’s results seem to be 
too optimistic, in terms of all the MOEs.  One of the reasons for these over-optimistic 
results could be the number of helos available during the simulations.  The number of 
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helos is kept constant because the model simulates the fact that early in the operational 
mission, most of the helos are not available due to the fact that they are transporting the 
Air Assault Company.  The remainder of the helos on the MEU (those not in the air 
assault wave) are made available for supporting downed AAAVs.  When the air assault 
helos return, they are added to the total number of helos available to the AAAV platoon.  
This could represent an unrealistic amount of the MEU’s vertical lift assets dedicated to 
supporting the AAAV platoon’s maintenance effort.   
The BLT on the MEU has three rifle companies that have to be inserted.  The 
current doctrine is that one of the companies be inserted via small zodiac boats.  
However, these simulations are modeling the insertion of the BLT many miles inland 
beyond the beachhead.  In this scenario, small boats might not be of any use (unless the 
boat company’s mission was to secure the beachhead and surrounding area, possibly to 
allow for the insertion of logistics assets via LCAC).  If the entire BLT is needed at the 
attack objective, which, in these models is at least 25 nm inland from the beachhead, then 
the MEU’s helo assets will probably need to insert two companies.  The first wave would 
likely go in a combined initial assault with the company being delivered by the AAAV 
platoon (as has been modeled in this thesis), then the helos would return to the ships to 
pick up and deliver the second company, which would be used in a tactical reserve status.   
If this is the case, then there should be an even longer period of time during which the 
number of helos available to the AAAV platoon for logistics support is very limited.  The 
following experiments use a model that implements this feature.  
An experiment is conducted to measure the time for the entire AAAV platoon (12 
AAAVs) to reach the LOD, which is 25 nm on land from the beachhead.  The beachhead 
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is 25 nm from the amphibious ships offshore.  Unlike the last experiment where the 
response variable is mean TTS, this time the platoon does not pause at the beachhead to 
wait for a particular number of AAAVs to become operational.  Therefore the mission of 
the AAAV platoon is to proceed from the ship to the beach and beyond to the LOD 
without stopping along the way.   
The five primary factors tested for their effects on the response variable (mean 
TTS) are:  failure times (MTTF), failure time distribution form, mean corrective 
maintenance time (MCMT), logistics support method, and the total number of helos 
available to the AAAV platoon.  All factors have only two levels each, which facilitates 
the use of a 2n experimental design, or in this case, a 25 design.  The total amount of runs 
required to compare each factor level with every other level is 32.  Each run consists of 
200 replications.   
As mentioned earlier, the model is changed to reflect the need to transport two 
rifle companies instead of just one.  This characteristic is present in both the levels of the 
factor, number of available helos.  In order to fully test the importance of the role of helos 
in support of the AAAV, the levels of this factor are changed from allowing all the 
remaining helos not transporting the Air Assault Companies to be available for support, 
to only two of the remaining four being available.  In addition, in the second level of this 
factor, even after all the Air Assault Companies are delivered, only two additional helos 
are assigned to be available to support the AAAV platoon.  Therefore the in the factor’s 
first level there are, at first, 4 helos available until two companies (requiring two round-
trips of the remaining helos) are delivered.  After the assault helos return, then an 
additional 12 are made available to the AAAV platoon.  In the factor’s second level, there 
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are 2 helos available initially, then when the assault helos return, only 2 more are added 
to the total number of helos available for the AAAV platoon.  The time until additional 
helos are added to the total number of helos available for logistics support is the time to 
travel from the ship to the objective, a constant 30 minute unload time, a return-trip travel 
time, followed by a randomly drawn refuel/reload time.  This cycle completes one round 
trip.  Two round trips are made in this model before additional helos are made available. 
This constrained factor level can be considered to be reasonable since helos are 
always in demand for many reasons other than logistics support of the AAAV platoon.  
Helos must always be set aside for medical evacuations and logistics resupply operations, 
and they need to always be ready to tactically maneuver the ground forces.  In addition, it 
is not always realistic to assume that of the 16 total helicopters on the MEU, all are fully 
operational.   
An additional factor that has not been studied prior to this experiment is the mean 
corrective maintenance time (MCMT), or the average time required to repair a downed 
AAAV.  Because in the three previous experiments, the form of the distribution of repair 
times is not found to be significant, it is not tested in this one.  A single distributional 
form, the Weibull distribution with κ = 2.0 is used and the MCMT is changed from 1.5 
hours (an ORD threshold requirement for the MCMT for 2nd Echelon, or unit level, 
repairs) to 3.0 hours.  Three hours is used to reflect the fact that not all failures are ones 
that only require 2nd echelon work.  A deployed MEU is capable of conducting up to 3rd 
echelon repairs, but there is no ORD requirement for the average length of these repairs. 
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Finally, because a Weibull Failure Distribution with a shape parameter of 3.5 
hardly produces any failures, regardless of the scale parameter used, it is discarded as a 
factor level.  Figures 37-40 below show the results of this experiment. 
 
 
Factor      Type  Levels  Values  
Helos      fixed      2   2/2  4/12 
Log Base   fixed      2   No   Yes 
MTTF (hrs)    fixed      2   36   72 
Fail Distn   fixed      2   Wei(med) Wei(hi) 
MCMT (hrs)    fixed      2   3   1 
 
Analysis of Variance for Time To, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Helos                1      6.177      6.177      6.177    3.27  0.089 
Log Base             1     13.497     13.497     13.497    7.15  0.017 
MTTF                 1     96.170     96.170     96.170   50.98  0.000 
Fail Dis             1    448.104    448.104    448.104  237.54  0.000 
MCMT                 1     66.151     66.151     66.151   35.07  0.000 
Helos*Log Base       1      1.741      1.741      1.741    0.92  0.351 
Helos*MTTF           1      3.964      3.964      3.964    2.10  0.166 
Helos*Fail Dis       1      5.848      5.848      5.848    3.10  0.097 
Helos*MCMT           1      0.389      0.389      0.389    0.21  0.656 
Log Base*MTTF        1      4.097      4.097      4.097    2.17  0.160 
Log Base*Fail Dis    1     11.682     11.682     11.682    6.19  0.024 
Log Base*MCMT        1      2.282      2.282      2.282    1.21  0.288 
MTTF*Fail Dis        1     63.612     63.612     63.612   33.72  0.000 
MTTF*MCMT            1     13.294     13.294     13.294    7.05  0.017 
Fail Dis*MCMT        1     52.259     52.259     52.259   27.70  0.000 
Error               16     30.183     30.183      1.886 
Total               31    819.450   
 
Figure 37.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Time for 12 AAAVs (out 
of 12) to Reach the LOD (TTS). 
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Figure 39.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are Times Required to Get 12 AAAVs 
 



























to the LOD (TTS).  
 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Fail Distn      Mean   -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
Wei(med)        2.49   (----*-----) 
Wei(hi)         9.97                            (----*----) 
                       -------+---------+---------+---------+---- 
                           3.00      6.00      9.00     12.00 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Helos           Mean   ----------+---------+---------+---------+- 
restricted      6.67          (----------------*-----------------) 
unrestricted    5.79    (-----------------*----------------) 
                       ----------+---------+---------+---------+- 
                              4.50      6.00      7.50      9.00 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
Log Base        Mean   --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
No              5.58   (----------------*----------------) 
Yes             6.88           (----------------*----------------) 
                       --+---------+---------+---------+--------- 
                      3.20      4.80      6.40      8.00 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
MTTF            Mean   ----------+---------+---------+---------+- 
36               8.0                     (-----------*-----------) 
72               4.5   (-----------*------------) 
                       ----------+---------+---------+---------+- 
                               4.0       6.0       8.0      10.0 
 
                       Individual 95% CI 
MCMT            Mean   ---------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
3                7.7                  (-----------*-----------) 
1                4.8    (-----------*-----------) 
                       ---------+---------+---------+---------+-- 
                              4.0       6.0       8.0      10.0 
 
Figure 40.   Means and Confidence Intervals for the Primary Factors Where the 
Response Variable is TTS. 
 
 
Before the data from the ANOVA model above in Figure 37 is analyzed a plot of 
the residuals versus the fitted values for this test is made to see if the same problems of 
heteroscedasticity seen before, exist in the current data.  Figure 41 below shows that there 
does not appear to be heteroscedasticity, however the residuals do appear to have a 
curvilinear relation, and possibly a nonnormal distribution since the residuals are 
unevenly distributed above and below the zero-line in the y-axis.  Further analysis of 
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these residuals is done this time in Figure 42, which shows a histogram of the residual 
terms of this model.  This plot shows some skewness to the right, but otherwise a 
distribution that can be generally summarized as normal, which is somewhat 
Figure 41.   Plot of Residuals Versus F
contradictory of the results of Figure 41. 
itted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 

































Figure 42.   Histogram of the Residuals Where the Response Variable is the Mean 
TTS. 
 
Once again, to try and alleviate the problem highlighted in the residuals versus 
fitted Y-value plot (Figure 41), the experiment above is conducted again, this time taking 
the log of the time to the LOD for each replication, then, averaging those replications to 
form a factor level mean.  This is another transformation technique that is widely used to 
when problems of nonnormality and heteroscedasticity exist in data.  The results of this 













Figure 43.   Plot of Residuals Versus Fitted Y-Values Where the Response Variable is 

























Factor      Type  Levels  Values  
Helos      fixed      2   2/2  4/12 
Log Base   fixed      2   No   Yes 
MTTF (hrs)    fixed      2   36   72 
Fail Distn   fixed      2   Wei(med) Wei(hi) 
MCMT (hrs)    fixed      2   3   1 
 
Analysis of Variance for log(TTS), using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Helos                1     0.0472     0.0472     0.0472    4.91  0.041 
Log Base             1     0.1324     0.1324     0.1324   13.76  0.002 
MTTF                 1     1.5916     1.5916     1.5916  165.42  0.000 
Fail Dis             1    13.6993    13.6993    13.6993 1423.85  0.000 
MCMT                 1     0.8853     0.8853     0.8853   92.02  0.000 
Helos*Log Base       1     0.0116     0.0116     0.0116    1.20  0.288 
Helos*MTTF           1     0.0156     0.0156     0.0156    1.62  0.220 
Helos*Fail Dis       1     0.0365     0.0365     0.0365    3.80  0.068 
He   
Lo   
Log Base*Fail Dis    1     0.0755     0.0755     0.0755    7.84  0.012 
Log Base*MCMT        1     0.0066     0.0066     0.0066    0.68  0.420 
MTTF*Fail Dis        1     0.2883     0.2883     0.2883   29.97  0.000 
Fail Dis*MCMT        1     0.3692     0.3692     0.3692   38.37  0.000 
Error               17     0.1636     0.1636     0.0096 
Total               31    17.3458   
Figure 45.   Analysis of Variance When the Log of Each Observation of TTS Is Taken. 
 
Figure 43 is the plot of the residuals versus the fitted y-values (mean log(TTB)).  
This plot seems to show that the transformation has eliminated the non-linear shape of the 
residuals, and made them more featureless and thus, homoscedastistic.  However, in the 
plot of the histogram of the residuals (Figure 44), the distribution seems even less normal 
than before (compared to Figure 42).  Finally, and most importantly, Figure 45 shows the 
analysis of variance for the log-transformation model.  The comparison to the ANOVA 
for the non-transformed model is, again, very similar.  The same factors that the first 
model finds to be significant are still significant in the transformed model, and those that 
 
los*MCMT         1     0.0013     0.0013     0.0013    0.13  0.719 
g Base*MTTF      1     0.0219     0.0219     0.0219    2.27  0.150 
the first model finds insignificant are still insignificant in the second model.  The one 
indication that the log-transformed model might be better in this case is the fact that in 
the first model, the error term accounts for 3.7% of the model’s variability, while in the 
transformed model, the error term only accounts for 0.94% of the variability.   
Regardless of which model is best, the fact is that the ANOVA and its F-test, 
although used extensively in this section as an analysis tool, is not by any means, used 
independently or exclusively.  The nature of this simulation model is that there are many 
variable factors that might have an effect on its MOEs.  ANOVA is simply an initial, 
exploratory tool to test for this significance.  Although some of the assumptions that the 
ANOVA requires may not be completely met in every case, it has been shown that the 
results do not change when all the assumptions are met.  In the end, the message is still 
that this test can help to explain which factors are important and which may not be as 
important. 
Using the ANOVA of the transformed data in Figure 45, it can be seen that all the 
primary factors tested are statistically significant, at least at a 95% confidence level.   As 
usual, the form of the distribution of failure times accounts for the lion’s share of the 
variability in the model. The percentage of variability due to this factor is 79%, which is 
roughly the same percentage of the explained variance compared to previous 
experiments.  In the non-transformed ANOVA this factor only accounts for 54.7%, which 
is a decline in explained variance compared to previous models.  One explanation for 
this, however, is that in previous experiments (using non-transformed data) the failure 
distribution factor has had three levels and the MCMT remained constant. The addition of 
changes in the MCMT introduces considerable variability, while the loss of the 
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distribution factor third level decreases (slightly) the factor’s total influence.  The MTTF 
factor accounts for 9.2% of the model’s variability and the MCMT Factor accounts for 
5.1%. 





 Even after creating a large range between the levels of the factor, number of 
available helos, it only accounts for 0.27% of the model’s variability.   As mentioned 
earlier the model’s unexplained variance, or the error term, accounts for only 0.94% of 
the model’s variability.  
As emphasized, however, the analysis of variance should not be the only analysis 
technique used.  Figures 39 and 40 show that all the primary factors have a significant 
practical effect on the mean time to get 12 AAAVs to the LOD.  This is illustrated by the 
fact that the helo availability factor affects the platoon’s ability to get to the LOD by an 
average of 5
n the MCMT Factor’s two levels is 2 hours and 54 minutes on average.  This, in 
particular, is an important fact to consider.  Up to now the message of the results of the 
models have been that the MTTF and the form of the distribution of failure times is 
extremely important.  That fact certainly has not changed.  However, these results point 
to the fact that testers should also be greatly concerned with the MCMT of all types of 
repairs.  In other words, a MCMT of 2  and 3  echelon type repairs combined should be 
measured, not just one for 2  echelon repairs.  If a large proportion of failures are of type 
3  echelon, or if the proportion is small, but the MCMT for 3  echelon repairs is large, 
this could have a substantial adverse affect on the platoon’s ability to deliver an 
adequate-sized force at a designated time. 
Once again, the measured between-run variability of this model is generally very 
large.  The average between-run variability for the entire experiment (measured in 
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standard deviations) is 5.48 hours.  Figures 46-49 show examples of the various 
distributions of the individual times to the LOD when the factor levels for the number of 
available helos, MTTF, MCMT and the distribution of failure times are varied. The 
minimum time to reach the LOD with no failures is 2 hours. 
0 10 20 30 40 50
 (shape = 1.537, scale = 80)
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Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 72 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 60)













Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 72 Hours 
Mean Time to Beach = 2.2 hours














Mean Time to Beach = 7.8 hours  
Figure 46.   Comparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD when the Shape 
Factor Levels are the Same: No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. 
Parameter is Varied to Change the Form of the Distribution of Failure Times.  All Other 
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Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 72 Hours 
Mean Time to Beach = 9.1 hours
Times to Reach the Destination for 12 AAAVs
 













Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 36 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 30)
Mean Time to Beach = 19.56 hours




 (shape = 0.742, scale = 60)
Figure 47.   Comparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD when the Scale 
Parameter is Varied to Change the MTTF.  All Other Factor Levels are the Same: No Log 
Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. 
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Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 36 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 30) 
 Restricted Number of Helos Available
Mean Time to Beach = 20.67 hours
Times to Reach the Destination for 12 AAAVs













Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 36 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 30) 
 Unrestricted Number of Helos Available
Mean Time to Beach = 19.56 hours
Times to Reach the Destination for 12 AAAVs
 
 
Fig o of 
MTTF = 36 hours, No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. 
ure 48.   C mparison of the Distribution of Times to the LOD When the Number 
Available Helos Varies from Large to Small.  All Other Factor Levels are the Same: 
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Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 72 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 60) 
 MCMT = 1.5 Hours
Mean Time to Beach = 5.22 hours
Times to Reach the Destination for 12 AAAVs













Weibull Distribution with MTTF = 72 Hours 
 (shape = 0.742, scale = 60) 
 MCMT = 3 Hours
Mean Time to Beach = 7.8 hours
Times to Reach the Destination for 12 AAAVs
 
 
Figure 49.   Comparison of the Distribution of the Times to the LOD When MCMT is 
aried From 1.5 Hours to 3.0 Hours.  All Other Factor Levels are the Same: MTTF = 7
hours, No Log Base Used, and MCMT = 3 hrs. 
V 2 
The last but most important observation to be made from this experiment, 
highlighted in Figure 40, is that the mean time to the LOD for a MTTF of 72 hours is 4 
hours and 30 minutes with a large confidence interval for the mean response that spans 
from the minimum time, 2 hours to greater than 7 hours.    This is perhaps the strongest 
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proof yet that the assumed form of the distribution of failure times is of the utmost 
importance.  Even at a MTTF of 72 hours, which is within the ORD threshold limit for 
this requirement, the variability of the ability to move a platoon 50 nm over a 
combination of water and land in a timely manner is huge based on the result of this 
model.   
 
8.  Further Analysis of Different Factor’s Effects on MOE Mission 
Availability (Am). 
Simultaneous to the experiment conducted above, another experiment is 
conducted on the MOE, Mission Availability (Am).  The experiments are conducted 
simultaneously because, after the experiment above measures the time to get 12 AAAVs 
to the LOD, the same simulation runs measure the platoon’s subsequent Am in the 
objective area.  Therefore the same five primary factors tested for their effects on the 
response variable (mean TTS) are also tested for their effects on Am. They are:  failure 
times (MTTF), failure time distribution form, mean corrective maintenance time 
(MCMT), logistics support method, and the total number of helos available to the AAAV 
platoon.  All factors have only two levels each, which facilitates the use of a 2n 
experimental design, or in this case, a 25 design.  The total number of runs required to 
replications.  Figures 50-51 below show the results of this model. 
compare each factor level with every other level is 32.  Each run consists of 200 
Once again all the factor main effects are statistically significant to a high level as 
seen in Figure 50.  However, just as in the previous experiment where Am is the response 
variable, none of the factors are practically significant as can be seen from Figure 51.  
The form of the distribution of failure times has the greatest physical effect on the 
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response variable, but even it only accounts for a difference of 0.69 AAAVs between its 
two levels.  The average between-run variability for the entire experiment (measured in 
standard deviations) was 0.042 or 0.504 AAAVs.  Figures 52-54 compare different factor 




Figure 50.   Analysis of Variance on the Response Variable Am. 
s of Variance for Mission Availability, using Adjusted SS for Tests 
 
Source              DF     Seq SS     Adj SS     Adj MS       F      P 
Log Base             1  0.0014696  0.0014696  0.0014696  252.85  0.000 
MTTF                 1  0.0095888  0.0095888  0.0095888 1649.70  0.000 
MCMT                 1  0.0009042  0.0009042  0.0009042  155.56  0.000 
Helos*Log Base       1  0.0000149  0.0000149  0.0000149    2.56  0.129 
Helos*Fail Dis       1  0.0000276  0.0000276  0.0000276    4.75  0.045 
Log Base*MTTF        1  0.0001509  0.0001509  0.0001509   25.96  0.000 
Log Base*Fail Dis    1  0.0008348  0.0008348  0.0008348  143.63  0.000 
MTTF*Fail Dis        1  0.0003404  0.0003404  0.0003404   58.57  0.000 
MTTF*MCMT            1  0.0000775  0.0000775  0.0000775   13.34  0.002 
Error               16  0.0000930  0.0000930  0.0000058 
 
Factor      Type  Levels  Values  
Helos   fixed      2   2/2  4/12 
Log Bas
MTTF (h
Fail Distn   Wei(med) Wei(hi) 
MCMT (hrs)    fixed      2   3   1 
 
Analysi
Helos                1  0.0000297  0.0000297  0.0000297    5.11  0.038 
Fail Distn           1  0.0264162  0.0264162  0.0264162 4544.77  0.000 
Helos*MTTF           1  0.0000044  0.0000044  0.0000044    0.76  0.397 
Helos*MCMT           1  0.0000010  0.0000010  0.0000010    0.16  0.691 
Log Base*MCMT        1  0.0000694  0.0000694  0.0000694   11.94  0.003 
Fail Dis*MCMT        1  0.0001356  0.0001356  0.0001356   23.33  0.000 
Total               31  0.0401579  
   
e   fixed      2   No   Yes 
rs)    fixed      2   36   72 
fixed      2   
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Helos Log Base MTTF Fail Distn MCMT
 
Figure 51.   Main Effects Plot Where the Means are the Number of AAAVs in the 
Platoon That are Operational During the Time the Platoon is in the Objective Area. 
 
Figure 52.   Comparison of The Effects of MCMT On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of 
Six Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective 




























































































MCMT = 1.5 hrs MCMT = 3 hrs
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Figure 53.   Comparison of The Effects of MTTF On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-Step of Six 
Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the Designated Objective 
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restricted helos unrestricted helos
Figure 54.   Comparison of The Effects of Number of Helos On Mean Ap(t) at a Time-
Step of Six Minutes for the Length of Time the Platoon is Operating in the Designated 
Although the effects of me average availability is 
not very substantial, using population means may not be telling the whole story, even 
Objective Area (MTTF = 36 hours with shape parameter κ = 0.742, MCMT = 3 hours). 
  
different factors on the mean ti
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more so than when the response variable is the mean TTB or TTS.   In Figures 52-54 
above, it is clear that, no matter what the factors or their levels, the platoon enters the 
objective area with 100% availability (because the platoon waits at the LOD until it has 
all AAAVs operationally available before proceeding) but immediately after entering the 
objective area the Ap(t) begins to drop, and then continues to drop until it reaches a 
steady-state after somewhere between 6 and 8 hours of operation in the objective area.  
As shown before in comparisons to long-term availability analytical equations, the 
observed long-term availability for these models is generally lower.  One of the reasons 
for the arbitrarily high values of Am in this section is likely due to the fact that all the 
 measured the A  starting with an A (t) of 12 vehicles oexperiments have r 100%.   
omparing the results of the time-step graphs in this section to those in the first 
section of this chapter shows that the model creates an Am steady-state after some length 
of time.  In both the simpler model and the models of this section, moving from the LOD 
to the attack objective creates a substantial decrease in Ap(t).  After those vehicles that 
fail while the platoon is en route are able to catch-up and the platoon is stationary at the 
attack objective, it begins to reach the steady-state.  And once again, when the statistical 
means are used without any other measure, as is the case in this experiment, their values 
are too optimistic.  Looking at the time-stepped plots of Am for observations where factor 
levels are constant, however, shows that even with a MTTF of 72 hours (albeit with a 
distribution of failure times that has a high number of infant failure times) the platoon 
m p
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VI.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
he models used in this thesis clearly show that, by far the most important factor 
for testers to consider in operational test and evaluation of the AAAV is the form of the 
assume  distribution of failure times.  Requirements that guide operational testing only 
specify, threshold and objective values for the mean time to failure (MTTF).  However, 
the results show that even with a high MTTF, if the distribution of those failure times 
allows a high or even moderate number of short, infant failure times, the results on a 
platoon of AAAV’s ability to perform its stated missions can be drastically detrimental.  
From a ship 25 nm offshore, with a MTTF of 72 hours for each vehicle, it is shown to 
take the entire platoon anywhere from 1 hour (the minimum time required to get to the 
beach) to 2.5 hours ried.  And from the 
ship to the beach, then onto the LOD (50 miles from the ship) a MTTF of 72 hours was 
shown to have a variation in the average times for the platoon anywhere from 2 hours 
(the minimum time required to get to the LOD) to more than seven hours.  In addition, 
when the MTTF was 72 hours with random failure times drawn from a Weibull 
distribution with a shape parameter of 0.75 and scale parameter of 60.0 (i.e. a high 
amount of infant failures) there were individual observations of the time for the platoon 
to reach the LOD with 12 working vehicles of up to 50 hours. 
Another conclusion is that, failures that occur when the AAAV is in its water-
transit mode can create many problems.  If there is no asset available for towing 
quiescent AAAVs to the shore or ship, then this job must be undertaken by other AAAVs 




when the distribution of the times to failure was va
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detrimental r within a 
certain amount of time is increased by a factor of two.  The results of the simple model 
created
Although there are many scenarios run and factors tested in this thesis, not all the 
possible factors and combinations are tested, nor are all the possible scenarios run.  This 
thesis is developed as a tool to help testers explore for sensitive aspects that they might 
not otherwise discover in actual testing, therefore the model should be exercised many 
more times and in many more ways.   Specifically, actual operational scenarios proposed 
for testing the AAAV should be run prior to the actual tests in order to highlight the 
sensitive aspects on which testers should focus. 
While the models in this thesis can hopefully add valuable insight into what 
aspects of operational testing are important and highly sensitive, there is much more that 
can be done.  Although many attempts were made to add reality to the model, much of 
this simulation is still oversimplified.  One of the biggest recommendations for 
 effect on the platoon’s ability to deliver effective combat powe
 in section 1 of Chapter V clearly demonstrate the advantages of having some 
other auxiliary craft available for towing failed AAAVs in the water.   
Finally, it was found that the MCMT can have a substantial effect on the MOEs 
time to reach the beach (TTB) and time to reach the LOD (TTS).  Although the ORD 
specifically lists a requirement for the MCMT of 2nd echelon repairs, it does not say 
anything about higher level (3rd echelon) repairs.  The model finds that an increase in 
MCMT from 1.5 hours to 3.0 hours has an average effect of 2 hours and 45 minutes on 
the mean time to reach the LOD.  Three hours is not an unreasonable average of 2nd and 
3rd echelon MCMT combined, so the message is that both times, as well as the proportion 
of failures that require each type of repair should be carefully measured.  
118
improvements to the simulation would be to explicitly model the AAAV into subsystems.  
If some subsystems fail, it would not necessarily catastrophically affect the AAAV’s 
ability to perform its mission.  Unfortunately, all failures in this model are treated 
equally.  By modeling each AAAV by its subsystems, many more important insights 
could be gained, one of which might be finding what limited parts and the number of 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
120
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Box, Hunter, Hunter (1978) Statistics for Experimenters, John Wiley & Sons, New York 
 
Buss (1996) Modeling With Event Graphs, Proceedings of the 1996 Winter Simulation 
Conference 
 
Conlon J. et al (1982).  Test and Evaluation of System Reliability Availability 
Maintainability—A Primer.  Office of the Director Defense Test and Evaluation Under 
Secretary Defense for Research and Engineering, Washington, D.C. 
 
Devore, Jay L. (1995) Probability and Statistics for Engineering and the Sciences, 
Duxbury Press 
 
DoD Directive 5141.2 “Director of Operational Test and Evaluation”, 17 January 1989 
DoD Regulation 5000.2R “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition 
Progra s and Major Automation Systems Acquisition Programs”, June 2001 
 
Donald P. Gaver et al (2001).  Modeling the Operation of a Platoon of Amphibious 
Vehicles for Support of Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E), Monterey, California 
 
Giadrosich D. (1995).  Operations Research Analysis in Test and Evaluation.  American 
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Inc.  Washington, D.C. 
 
Hamilton, Lawrence C.  (1992) Regression with Graphics, Duxbury Press, Belmont, 
California 
 
Leemis, Lawrence M. (1995) Reliability, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 
 
Marine Corps Systems Command (2000), “Operational Requirements Document for the 
Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) ACAT I-D Prepared for Milestone II 





Schmidt K. (1999).  Model
Evaluation of a Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System.  Masters Thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
 
 
latform.  Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA 
A. (1996) Sensors in Object Oriented Discrete Event Simulation, Masters 













ing and Simulation Support for the Operational Test and 






























2. Dudley Knox Library 
onterey, CA  93943-5101 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
 
Naval Postgraduate School 




. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
Quantico, Virginia 
4
   
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
Quantico, VA  22134-5027 
  
 
. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 









8. Professor David Schrady 
ode OR/So 
aval Postgraduate School 
 onterey, CA 93943 
 
C
N
M
 
 
 
 
123
  
 
124
